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Numerous generalization techniques have been proposed for privacy preserving data publishing.
Most existing techniques, however, implicitly assume that the adversary knows little about the
anonymization algorithm adopted by the data publisher. Consequently, they cannot guard against
privacy attacks that exploit various characteristics of the anonymization mechanism. This paper
provides a practical solution to the above problem. First, we propose an analytical model for
evaluating disclosure risks, when an adversary knows everything in the anonymization process,
except the sensitive values. Based on this model, we develop a privacy principle, transparent
l-diversity, which ensures privacy protection against such powerful adversaries. We identify three
algorithms that achieve transparent l-diversity, and verify their effectiveness and efficiency through
extensive experiments with real data.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—
Statistical Databases
General Terms: Theory, Algorithms, Experimentation
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Privacy Preserving Data Publishing, Generalization, l-
Diversity
1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy protection is highly important in the publication of sensitive personal in-
formation (referred to as microdata), such as census data and medical records. A
common practice in anonymization is to remove the identifiers (e.g., social security
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Name Age Zipcode Disease 
Ann 21 10000 dyspepsia 
Bob 27 18000 flu 
Cate 32 35000 gastritis 
Don 32 35000 bronchitis 
Ed 54 60000 gastritis 
Fred 60 63000 flu  
Gill 60 63000 dyspepsia 
Hera 60 63000 diabetes 
 
Table I. Microdata T1
Name Age Zipcode 
Ann 21 10000 
Bob 27 18000 
Bruce 29 19000 
Cate 32 35000 
Don 32 35000 
Ed 54 60000 
Fred 60 63000 
Gill 60 63000 
Hera 60 63000 
 
Table II. Voter List E1
Age Zipcode Disease 
[21, 27] [10k, 18k] dyspepsia 
[21, 27] [10k, 18k] flu 
32 35000 gastritis 
32 35000 bronchitis 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] gastritis 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] flu  
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] dyspepsia 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] diabetes 
 
Table III. Generalization T ∗2
numbers or names) that uniquely determine entities of interest. This, however, is
not sufficient because an adversary may utilize the remaining attributes to identify
individuals [Samarati 2001]. For instance, consider that a hospital publishes the
microdata in Table I, without disclosing the patient names. Utilizing the publicly-
accessible voter registration list in Table II, an adversary can still discover Ann’s
disease, by joining Tables I and II. The joining attributes {Age, Zipcode} are called
the quasi-identifiers (QI).
Generalization [Samarati 2001] is a popular solution to the above problem. It
works by first assigning tuples to QI-groups, and then transforming the QI values in
each group to an identical form. As an example, Table III illustrates a generalized
version of Table I with three QI-groups. Specifically, the first, second, and third QI-
groups contain the tuples {Ann, Bob}, {Cate, Don}, and {Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera},
respectively. Even with the voter registration list in Table II, an adversary still
cannot decide whether Ann owns the first or second tuple in Table III, i.e., Ann’s
disease cannot be inferred with absolute certainty.
Generalizations can be divided into global recoding and local recoding [LeFevre
et al. 2005]. The former demands that if two tuples have identical QI values, they
must be generalized to the same QI-group. Without this constraint, the general-
ization is said to use local recoding. For instance, Table III obeys global recoding.
Notice that Cate and Don have equivalent QI-values in the microdata (Table I),
and therefore must be included in the same QI-group. This is also true for Fred,
Gill, and Hera.
The privacy-preservation power of generalization relies on the underlying privacy
principle, which determines what is a publishable QI-group. Numerous principles
are available in the literature, offering different degrees of privacy protection. One
popular, intuitive and effective principle is l-diversity [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007].
It requires that, in each QI-group, at most 1/l of the tuples can have the same
sensitive value1. This ensures that an adversary can have at most 1/l confidence
in inferring the sensitive information of an individual. For example, Table III is
2-diverse. Thus, an adversary can discover the disease of a person with at most
50% probability.
Interestingly, none of the existing privacy principles (except those in [Wong et al.
2007] and [Zhang et al. 2007]) specifies any requirement on the algorithm that pro-
duce the generalized tables. Instead, they impose constraints only on the formation
1There also exist other formulations of l-diversity, as will be discussed in Section 2.1
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
· 3
of the QI-groups (like l-diversity does), which, unfortunately, leaves open the op-
portunity for an adversary to breach privacy by exploiting the characteristics of the
generalization algorithm. This problem is first pointed out by Wong et al. [2007],
who demonstrate a minimality attack2 that (i) can compromise most existing gener-
alization techniques, and (ii) requires only a small amount of knowledge about the
generalization algorithm. As a solution, they propose an anonymization approach
that can guard against minimality attacks.
The work by Wong et al. reveals an essential issue in publishing microdata: a
generalization method should preserve privacy, even against adversaries with knowl-
edge of the anonymization algorithm. Towards addressing this issue, the techniques
in [Wong et al. 2007] establish the first step by dealing with minimality attacks,
which, however, is still insufficient for privacy protection. Specifically, given in-
formation about the anonymization method, an adversary can easily devise other
types of attacks to circumvent a generalized table. To explain this, in the following
we first clarify how minimality attacks work, and then, elaborate the deficiencies
of [Wong et al. 2007].
Minimality Attacks. Good generalization should keep the QI values as accurate
as possible. Towards this objective, the previous algorithms [Bayardo and Agrawal
2005; Fung et al. 2005; Ghinita et al. 2007; LeFevre et al. 2005; 2006a; Xiao and
Tao 2007] produce minimal generalizations, where no QI-group can be divided into
smaller groups without violating the underlying privacy principle. For example,
Table III is a minimal 2-diverse generalization of Table I under global recoding. In
particular, the first (second) QI-group in Table III cannot be divided, since any
split of the group results in two QI-groups with a single tuple, which apparently
cannot be 2-diverse. On the other hand, as Fred, Gill, and Hera have identical QI
values, their tuples must be in the same QI-group, as demanded by global recoding.
Therefore, the only way to partition the third QI-group is to break it into {Ed}
and {Fred, Gill, Hera}, which also violate 2-diversity.
Minimal generalizations can lead to severe privacy breach. Consider that a hos-
pital holds the microdata in Table IV, and releases the 2-diverse Table V, which
is a minimal generalization under global recoding. Assume that an adversary has
access to the voter registration list in Table II. Then, s/he can easily identify the
six individuals in the second QI-group G2 = {Cate, Don, Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera}
in Table V. After that, the adversary can infer the diseases of Cate and Don by
reasoning as follows (i.e., a minimality attack). First, there exist only two tuples in
G2 with the same disease, which is gastritis. Second, since Table V is minimal, if we
split G2 into two parts G3 = {Cate, Don} and G4 = {Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera}, either
G3 or G4 must violate 2-diversity. Assume that G4 is not 2-diverse. In that case,
at least three tuples in G4 should have an identical sensitive value, contradicting
the fact that, in G2, the maximum number of tuples with the same Disease value is
2. It follows that G3 cannot be 2-diverse, indicating that both Cate and Don have
the same disease, which must be gastritis (as mentioned earlier, no other disease is
2Note that minimality attack can be effective only when the microdata is anonymized with gen-
eralization or a similar methodology called anatomy [Xiao and Tao 2006a]. There exist other
anonymization methods that are immune to attacks based on knowledge of the anonymization
algorithm, as will be discussed in Section 5.
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Name Age Zipcode Disease 
Ann 21 10000 dyspepsia 
Bob 27 18000 flu 
Cate 32 35000 gastritis 
Don 32 35000 gastritis 
Ed 54 60000 bronchitis 
Fred 60 63000 flu  
Gill 60 63000 dyspepsia 
Hera 60 63000 diabetes 
 
Table IV. Microdata T3
Age Zipcode Disease 
[21, 27] [10k, 18k] dyspepsia 
[21, 27] [10k, 18k] flu 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] gastritis 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] gastritis 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] bronchitis 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] flu  
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] dyspepsia 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] diabetes 
 
Table V. Generalization T ∗4
Algorithm Vul-Gen (T )
1. if T is the microdata T1 in Table I
return the generalization T ∗4 in Table V
2. otherwise, return a generalization of T that is different from T ∗4
Fig. 1. The Vul-Gen algorithm
possessed by two tuples in G2).
Motivation. Wong et al. [2007] advance the other solutions by assuming that
an adversary has one extra piece of knowledge: whether the anonymization algo-
rithm produces a minimal generalization (note: the adversary is not allowed to have
other details of the algorithm). Under this assumption, minimality attacks can be
prevented using a simple solution — just deploy non-minimal generalizations. Nev-
ertheless, given knowledge of the algorithm, can the adversary employ other types
of attacks to compromise non-minimal generalizations? The answer, unfortunately,
is positive, as can be demonstrated in a simple example as follows.
Example 1. Consider the conceptual anonymization algorithm Vul-Gen in Fig-
ure 1. The algorithm takes as input a microdata table T , and generates a general-
ization T ∗ of T . In particular, Vul-Gen outputs the generalization T ∗4 in Table V, if
and only if T equals the microdata T1 in Table I. Notice that, T
∗
4 is not a minimal
2-diverse version of T1. This is because, the second QI-group of T
∗
4 , including the
tuples {Cate, Don, Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera}, can be divided into 2-diverse QI-groups
{Cate, Don} and {Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera}, which conform to global recoding.
Assume that a data publisher applies Vul-Gen on T1, and releases the resulting
2-diverse generalization T ∗4 . Since T
∗
4 is not minimal, it does not suffer from min-
imality attacks. However, imagine an adversary who knows that Vul-Gen is the
generalization algorithm adopted by the publisher. Once T ∗4 is released, the adver-
sary immediately concludes that T1 is the microdata, because Vul-Gen outputs T
∗
4
if and only if the input is T1. Hence, the adversary learns the exact disease of every
individual, i.e., releasing T ∗4 causes a severe privacy breach. 
It is clear from the above discussion that preventing minimality attacks alone is
insufficient for privacy preservation, since an adversary (with understanding about
the generalization algorithm) may employ numerous other types of attacks to infer
sensitive information. This leads to a challenging problem: how can we anonymize
the microdata in a way that proactively prevents all privacy attacks that may be
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launched based on knowledge of the algorithm?
Zhang et al. [2007] present the first theoretical study on the above problem.
The core of their solution is a privacy model in which the anonymization algorithm
(adopted by the publisher) is assumed to be public knowledge3. As will be discussed
in Section 2.3, however, Zhang et al.’s privacy model is only applicable on a small
subset of anonymization algorithms that (i) are deterministic, (ii) adopt global
recoding generalization, and (iii) follow a particular algorithmic framework. This
severely restricts the design of new anonymization approaches under the model, and
makes it impossible to verify the privacy guarantees of existing randomized or local-
recoding-based algorithms. Furthermore, the anonymization algorithms proposed
by Zhang et al. have high time complexities: All but one algorithm run in time
exponential in the number n of tuples in the microdata, while the remaining one
has a time complexity that is polynomial in n and the total number m of possible
generalizations of the microdata. Note that, in practice, m can be an exponential of
n, since there may exist an exponential number of ways to divide the tuples in the
microdata into QI-groups. As a consequence, the algorithms developed by Zhang
et al. are rather inapplicable in practice.
Contributions. This paper develops a practical solution for data publishing
against an adversary who knows the anonymization algorithm. First, we propose a
model for evaluating the degree of privacy protection achieved by an anonymized
table, assuming that the adversary has knowledge of (i) the anonymization algo-
rithm employed by the publisher, (ii) the algorithmic parameters with which the
anonymized table is computed, and (iii) the QI values of all individuals in the
microdata. Our model captures all deterministic and randomized generalization
algorithms [Aggarwal et al. 2006; Bayardo and Agrawal 2005; Fung et al. 2005;
Ghinita et al. 2007; LeFevre et al. 2005; 2006a; 2006b; Iyengar 2002; Wang et al.
2004; Wong et al. 2006; Xiao and Tao 2007; Xu et al. 2006; Wong et al. 2007;
Zhang et al. 2007], regardless of whether they adopt global recoding or local recod-
ing. The model is even applicable for anonymized tables produced from anatomy
[Xiao and Tao 2006a], a popular anonymization methodology that will be clarified
in Section 2.1. Based on this model, we develop a new privacy principle called
transparent l-diversity, which safeguards privacy against the adversary we consider.
As a second step, we identify two sufficient conditions for transparent l-diversity,
based on which we propose three anonymization algorithms that achieve transpar-
ent l-diversity. None of these algorithms could have been possible under Zhang
et al.’s privacy model, as they are either randomized or based on local recoding.
We provide detailed analysis on the characteristics of each algorithm, and show
that they all run in O(n2 logn) time. In addition, we demonstrate the effective-
ness and efficiency of our algorithms through extensive experiments with real data.
Compared with the existing anonymization techniques that do not ensure transpar-
ent l-diversity, our solutions not only provide stronger privacy protection, but also
achieve satisfactory performance in terms of data utility and computation overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
3This is reminiscent of Kerckhoffs’ principle (well adopted in cryptography): a cryptographic
system should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.
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framework that underlies transparent l-diversity. Section 3 presents our generaliza-
tion algorithms, which are experimentally evaluated in Section 4. Section 5 surveys
the previous work related to ours. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with
directions for future research.
2. PRIVACY MODEL
This section presents our analytical model for assessing disclosure risks. In Sec-
tion 2.1, we formalize several basic concepts. After that, Section 2.2 elaborates
the derivation of disclosure risks. Section 2.3 discusses the differences between our
model and the methods in [Wong et al. 2007] and [Zhang et al. 2007].
2.1 Preliminaries
Let T be a microdata table to be published. We assume that T contains d + 2
attributes, namely, (i) an identifier attribute Aid, which is the primary key of T ,
(ii) a sensitive attribute As, and (iii) d QI attributes Aq1, ..., A
q
d. As in most existing
work, we require that As should be categorical, while the other attributes can be
either numerical or categorical.
For each tuple t in T , let t[A] be the value of t on the attribute A. We define a
QI-group as a set of tuples, and a partition of T as a set of disjoint QI-groups of T
whose union equals T . We say that two QI-groups G1 and G2 are isomorphic, if
(i) G1 and G2 contain the same multi-set of sensitive values, and (ii) every tuple
t1 ∈ G1 shares the same identifier and QI values with a tuple t2 ∈ G2, and vice
versa. For instance, let G1 be a QI-group that contains the first two tuples in
Table I. Suppose that we swap the sensitive values of Ann and Bob, such that Ann
(Bob) has flu (dyspepsia). Then, the resulting QI-group G2 is isomorphic to G1.
We formalize the anonymization of T as follows.
Definition 1 (Anonymization). An anonymization function f is a func-
tion that maps a QI-group to another set of tuples, such that for any two isomorphic
QI-groups G1 and G2, f(G1) = f(G2) always holds. Given a partition P of T and
an anonymization function f , a table T ∗ is an anonymization of T decided by P
and f , if and only if T ∗ =
⋃
G∈P f(G).
There exist two popular types of anonymization methodologies, namely, gener-
alization [Samarati 2001] and anatomy [Xiao and Tao 2006a]. Specifically, gener-
alization employs an anonymization function that maps a QI-group G to a set G∗
of tuples, such that (i) for any tuple t∗ ∈ G∗, t∗[Aqi ] (i ∈ [1, d]) is an interval con-
taining all Aqi values in G, and (ii) any two tuples in G
∗ have the same QI values.
Anatomy, on the other hand, adopts an anonymization function that transforms
a QI-group G to two separate sets of tuples, such that first (second) set contains
only the QI (sensitive) values in G. For example, given a partition of Table I that
contains three QI-groups {Ann, Bob}, {Cate, Don}, and {Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera},
Table VI illustrates an anonymization of Table I produced from anatomy. Observe
that Table VIa (VIb) contains only the QI (sensitive) values in Table I.
The techniques developed in this paper can be incorporated with any anonymiza-
tion method that conforms to Definition 1. For ease of exposition, in the rest of the
paper we will adopt a specific anonymization function, namely, theMBR (Minimum
Bounding Rectangle) generalization function [Bayardo and Agrawal 2005; Ghinita
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
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Age Zipcode Group ID 
21 10000 1 
27 18000 1 
32 35000 2 
32 35000 2 
54 60000 3 
60 63000 3 
60 63000 3 
60 63000 3 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Group ID Disease 
1 dyspepsia 
1 flu 
2 bronchitis 
2 gastritis 
3 diabetes  
3 dyspepsia 
3 flu 
3 gastritis 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(a) The QI table (b) The sensitive table
Table VI. An anonymization of Table I produced from anatomy
et al. 2007; LeFevre et al. 2006a; Xiao and Tao 2007]. This function anonymizes a
QI-group G by replacing each Aqi (i ∈ [1, d]) value with the tightest interval that
contains all Aqi values in G. For instance, Table III is obtained by applying the MBR
function to a partition of Table I with three QI-groups {Ann, Bob}, {Cate, Don},
and {Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera}.
Let T ∗ be the anonymization of T released by the publisher. T ∗ should satisfy
l-diversity:
Definition 2 (l-Diversity [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007]). A QI-group
G is l-diverse, if and only if it contains at most |G|/l tuples with the same sensitive
value. A partition is l-diverse, if and only if each of its QI-groups is l-diverse. An
anonymization is l-diverse, if and only if it is produced from an l-diverse partition.
It is noteworthy that there exist several different definitions of l-diversity
[Machanavajjhala et al. 2007]. For example, entropy l-diversity requires that the
entropy of sensitive values in each QI-group should be at least ln l; recursive (c, l)-
diversity demands that, even if we remove l − 2 arbitrary sensitive values in a QI-
group G, at most c fraction of the remaining tuples should have the same sensitive
value. Definition 2 corresponds to a simplified version of recursive (c, l)-diversity,
and has been widely adopted previously [Ghinita et al. 2007; Xiao and Tao 2006a;
Wong et al. 2006; Wong et al. 2007].
Let G be the anonymization algorithm adopted by the publisher. G can be either
deterministic or randomized, but it should be an l-diversity algorithm. That is,
G should take as input any microdata T ′ and any positive integer l, and output
either ∅ or an l-diverse anonymization of T ′. In particular, G may return ∅, when
no l-diverse anonymization exists for T ′. For instance, given the microdata T1 in
Table I, no algorithm can generate a 10-diverse anonymization, since T1 contains
only 8 tuples.
Consider an adversary who tries to infer sensitive information from T ∗. As
demonstrated in Section 1, the adversary may employ an external source (e.g.,
a voter registration list) to identify the individuals involved in T ∗. More formally,
we define an external source E as a table that contains all attributes in T , except
As. In addition, for each tuple t ∈ T , there should exist a unique record e ∈ E,
such that t and e coincide on all identifier and QI attributes. In other words, each
individual in T should appear in E, but not necessarily vice versa. For example,
the external source E1 in Table II involves all individuals in the microdata T1 in
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
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Table I, but it also contains the information of Bruce, who does not appear in T1.
In addition to E and T ∗, we also assume that the adversary knows the details
of the anonymization algorithm G and the value of l used by the publisher (in
practice, l can be inferred from T ∗ [Wong et al. 2007]). We quantify the disclosure
risks incurred by the publication of T ∗ as:
Definition 3 (Disclosure Risk). For any individual o, the disclosure risk
risk(o) of o in T ∗ is the tight upper-bound of the adversary’s posterior belief in the
event that “o appears in T and has a sensitive value v”, given T ∗, any sensitive
value v, the external source E, the algorithm G, and the value of l:
risk(o) = max
v∈As
Pr
{
o appears in T and has a sensitive value v | T ∗∧E∧G∧l
}
, (1)
where Pr{X | Y } denotes the conditional probability of event X given the occurrence
of event Y .
2.2 Disclosure Risks in Anonymized Tables
Next, we present a detailed analysis of disclosure risks. Before examining T ∗, the
adversary has no information about (i) which individuals in the external source E
appear in T , and (ii) what is the sensitive value of each person. Thus, from the
adversary’s perspective, there exist many possible instances of the microdata. In
particular, each instance Tˆ may involve any individuals in E, and each person in
Tˆ can have an arbitrary sensitive value. We formally define such instances as:
Definition 4 (Possible Microdata Instance). Given an external source
E, a possible microdata instance based on E is a microdata table Tˆ that con-
tains a subset of the individuals in E, such that each of these individuals have the
same QI values in E and Tˆ (the sensitive value of each individual in Tˆ can be
arbitrary).
For example, given the external source in Table II, Table VII is a possible mi-
crodata instance. Note that, the microdata T itself is also a possible instance. In
general, possible instances may be completely different from T , e.g., Table I and
Table VII do not even have the same cardinality. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
assume that, before inspecting T ∗, the adversary considers each possible instance to
be equally likely. This assumption is referred to as the random worlds assumption
[Bacchus et al. 1996], and is adopted by most existing work on data anonymization4
[Byun et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2007; Kifer and Gehrke 2006; LeFevre et al. 2006b;
Li et al. 2007; Martin et al. 2007; Nergiz et al. 2007; Wang and Fung 2006; Wong
et al. 2006; Wong et al. 2007; Xiao and Tao 2006b; 2007; Zhang et al. 2007; Zhang
et al. 2007].
Let S be the set of all possible microdata instances based on E. Now, consider
that the adversary has obtained T ∗, the anonymization algorithm G, and the pa-
rameter l. For simplicity, assume for the moment that G is deterministic. The
adversary can utilize the algorithm G to refine S. Specifically, s/he can apply G on
4Recent research [Kifer 2009] shows that, when the random worlds assumption does not hold,
some of the existing anonymization methods are vulnerable to privacy attacks based on machine
learning techniques. The treatment of such privacy attacks is beyond of the scope of this paper.
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
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Name Age Zipcode Disease 
Bruce 29 19000 bronchitis 
Cate 32 35000 flu 
Fred 60 63000 dyspepsia 
 
Table VII. A Possible Microdata Instance Based on Table II
Algorithm Opt-Gen (T , l)
1. Sp = a set containing all partitions P of T , such that P and the MBR function
decide an l-diverse global recoding generalization
2. if Sp = ∅ then return ∅
3. among all P ∈ Sp, select the one that minimizes
∑
G∈P |G|
2
4. return the generalization determined by P and the MBR function
Fig. 2. The Opt-Gen algorithm
each instance Tˆ ∈ S, and inspect the output of G. If Tˆ leads to an anonymization
different from T ∗, the adversary asserts that, Tˆ is not the real microdata T . Let S′
be the set of instances that pass the sanity check, i.e., for each Tˆ ∈ S′, G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗
(apparently, T ∈ S′).
The adversary then uses S′ to infer the sensitive information in T . As a special
case, if an individual o is associated with an As value v in all instances in S′, then
v must be the As value of o in T . In general, the probability that o has v in T
depends on the portion of instances in S′ where o has v. We refer to the above
inference approach as a reverse engineering attack.
Example 2. Consider the l-diversity generalization algorithm Opt-Gen, as
shown in Figure 2. In a nutshell, Opt-Gen employs the MBR function, and re-
turns l-diverse generalizations that (i) obey global recoding, and (ii) minimize the
discernability metric [Bayardo and Agrawal 2005]. Specifically, the discernability
of a generalized table T ∗ equals
∑
G∈P |G|
2, where P is the partition that decides
T ∗.
Suppose that a publisher adopts Opt-Gen to anonymize the microdata T1 in
Table I, setting l to 2. Table III illustrates the resulting generalization T ∗2 . Assume
that an adversary has the external source E1 in Table II, and knows Opt-Gen and
l = 2. To launch a reverse engineering attack, s/he first constructs the set S of
all possible microdata instances based on E1 (e.g., Table VII is one instance in
S). As a second step, the adversary invokes Opt-Gen on each Tˆ ∈ S, and verifies
whether the output of Opt-Gen is T ∗2 . Let S
′ be the maximal subset of S such that
Opt-Gen(Tˆ , 2)=T ∗2 for each Tˆ ∈S
′. In the sequel, we will show that every Tˆ ∈ S′
must associate Ed with gastritis. Namely, based on T ∗2 , E1, l=2, and the details
of Opt-Gen, the adversary can infer the exact disease of Ed.
Let G1, G2, and G3 be the first, second, and third QI-group in T
∗
2 , respectively.
Any Tˆ ∈ S, which can be generalized to T ∗2 , must satisfy the following conditions.
First, Tˆ should not involve Bruce, since his age 29 is not covered by any Age interval
in T ∗2 . Second, Tˆ should either (i) associate Ann with dyspepsia and Bob with flu,
or (ii) conversely, associate Ann and Bob with flu and dyspepsia, respectively. This
is because, Ann and Bob are the only individuals whose ages fall in the Age interval
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
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[21, 27] of G1, while G1 contains two sensitive values dyspepsia and flu. By the same
reasoning, Tˆ should assign the diseases in G2 (G3) to Cate and Don (Ed, Fred, Gill,
and Hera).
We are now ready to prove that, any possible microdata instance in S′ must set
the sensitive value of Ed to gastritis. Assume, on the contrary, that this is not
true in a Tˆ ′ ∈ S′. Then, since Ed is in G3, his disease in Tˆ
′ must be one of {flu,
diabetes, dyspepsia}, i.e., the sensitive values in G3 except gastritis. In that case,
Ed’s disease in Tˆ ′ must differ from those of Cate and Don (each of whom suffers
from either gastritis or bronchitis in Tˆ ′). Hence, we can construct a 2-diverse QI-
group G′2 ={Cate, Don, Ed}. The other tuples in Tˆ
′ can also form two 2-diverse
QI-groups G′1 = {Ann, Bob}, and G
′
3 = {Fred, Gill, Hera}.
Let P ′ = {G′1, G
′
2, G
′
3}, which decides a 2-diverse global recoding generalization.
Let us refer to that generalization as T ′∗. The discernability of T ′∗ is 22+32+32 =
22, which is smaller than the discernability 24 of T ∗2 . As Opt-Gen minimizes the
discernability, given Tˆ ′ as the input, it should have output T ′∗ instead of T ∗2 , leading
to a contradiction. In conclusion, Ed must be assigned a sensitive value gastritis in
any Tˆ ∈ S′. 
The above discussion motivates the following proposition for computing disclo-
sure risks.
Proposition 1. Let o be any individual, E be an external source, and T ∗ be
an anonymization of T produced with an l-diversity algorithm G and a parameter l.
Let S be the set of possible microdata instances based on E. Let So,v be the maximal
subset of S, such that each instance Tˆ ∈ So,v includes a tuple t, with t[Aid] = o and
t[As] = v. Then,
risk(o) = max
v∈As
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr
{
G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗
}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr
{
G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗
} , (2)
where Pr
{
G(Tˆ ,l) = T ∗
}
denotes the probability that, given Tˆ and l, algorithm G
outputs T ∗.
The proofs of all propositions, lemmas, and theorems can be found in the ap-
pendix. We are now ready to introduce the transparent l-diversity principle, for
protecting privacy when the anonymization algorithm is “transparent” to adver-
saries.
Definition 5 (Transparent l-Diversity). An anonymization T ∗ of T is
transparently l-diverse if, given any external source, T ∗ ensures risk(o) ≤ 1/l
for any individual o. An l-diversity algorithm G is transparent, if and only if
given any microdata T and any positive integer l, algorithm G outputs either ∅ or
a transparently l-diverse anonymization of T .
Intuitively, an l-diversity algorithm G is transparent, if and only if each output
T ∗ of G can be generated from a set S of possible microdata instances, such that
each individual o is associated with a diverse set of sensitive values in different
instances. As the adversary cannot decide which instance in S corresponds to the
input microdata, s/he would not be able to infer the exact sensitive value of o from
T ∗. The fact that each instance in S can lead to T ∗ implies that the output of G
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should not be highly dependent on the sensitive value of any particular individual.
For instance, the Opt-Gen algorithm fails in Example 2, because it outputs T ∗2
(in Table III) only if Ed has a sensitive value gastritis. In general, a transparent
algorithm should anonymize data in a manner such that none of the steps of the
anonymization process is uniquely decided by the sensitive value of a particular
tuple. In Section 3, we will present three transparent algorithms that are developed
according to the above principle.
2.3 Comparison with Previous Work
As explained in Section 1, [Wong et al. 2007] and [Zhang et al. 2007] are the only
previous works that do not assume adversaries with no knowledge of the anonymiza-
tion algorithm G. In this section, we elaborate the solutions in [Wong et al. 2007]
and [Zhang et al. 2007], and point out how they differ from our solution.
Comparison with [Wong et al. 2007]. The privacy model in [Wong et al.
2007] assumes that (i) the anonymization algorithm G is deterministic, and (ii) the
adversary knows whether G produces minimal generalization. To clarify the model,
we begin by reviewing several concepts in [Wong et al. 2007].
Definition 6 (Child Partition). Let P1 and P2 be two partitions of T . P2
is a child of P1, if and only if there exist G1 ∈ P1 and G2, G3 ∈ P2, such that (i)
G1 = G2 ∪G3, and (ii) P1 − {G1} = P2 − {G2, G3}.
Note that we can obtain a child of a partition P , by splitting a QI-group in P
into two smaller QI-groups.
Definition 7 (Minimal Generalization). Let f be a generalization func-
tion, P an l-diverse partition, and T ∗ the generalization decided by f and P . T ∗ is
a minimal l-diverse generalization under global (local) recoding, if f and any
child of P cannot decide an l-diverse generalization under the same recoding.
For example, Table III is a minimal 2-diverse generalization of Table I with
respect to the MBR function and global recoding, as explained in Section 1. Given
a generalization function f and recoding scheme H , we say that an l-diversity
algorithm is minimal, if it produces only minimal generalizations under f and H .
The subsequent discussion will focus on minimal algorithms G, because the results
of [Wong et al. 2007] are inapplicable to non-minimal algorithms (i.e., minimality
attacks cannot be performed if G is non-minimal).
In a similar fashion to Definition 1, Wong et al. [2007] formulate the disclosure
risks (referred to as credibilities in [Wong et al. 2007]) as:
Definition 8 (Credibility). Let o be any individual, and V be a predefined
subset of the values in As. The credibility of o in T ∗ is the adversary’s maximum
posterior belief in the event that “o appears in T and has a sensitive value v”, given
T ∗, an external source E, generalization function f , recoding scheme H, value of
l, and G being minimal:
cred(o) = max
v∈V
Pr
{
o has v in T | T ∗ ∧ E ∧ f ∧H ∧ l ∧ G is minimal
}
.
Note that the credibility model quantifies disclosure risks based only on a subset
V of the As values. To facilitate the comparison between the credibility model and
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our privacy model, we assume V = As in the rest of the paper.
Credibilities can be derived as:
Proposition 2 [Wong et al. 2007]. Let o, E, f , H, l be as introduced in
Definition 8. Let S+ be the set including any possible microdata instance Tˆ based
on E, such that T ∗ is a minimal l-diverse generalization of Tˆ with respect to f and
H. Let S+o,v be the maximal subset of S
+, such that in each instance in S+, o is
associated with a sensitive value v. We have
cred(o) = max
v∈As
|S+o,v|/|S
+|. (3)
The following analysis will confirm the intuition that credibilities underestimate
the actual privacy risks, when an adversary knows everything about G. Towards
this, let us revisit the scenario in Example 2, where the adversary can precisely
find out Ed’s disease with a reverse engineering attack, i.e, the disclosure risk of Ed
equals the maximum value 1. In the sequel, we will show that cred(Ed) = 1/4.
Lemma 1. The Opt-Gen algorithm (in Figure 2) is a minimal algorithm.
Example 3. Consider the settings in Example 2, where T =T1, T
∗=T ∗2 , E=E1,
G=Opt-Gen, l=2, o= Ed. Since Opt-Gen is a minimal algorithm (see Lemma 1),
by Proposition 2, the credibility of Ed in T ∗2 is calculated as maxv∈As |S
+
o,v|/|S
+|,
where S+ is the set of all possible microdata instances that have T ∗2 as a minimal
generalization, and S+o,v is the subset of instances in S
+ that associate Ed with a
certain sensitive value v.
Let Tˆ be any possible microdata instance based on E1. As demonstrated in
Example 2, if Tˆ can be generalized to T ∗2 , then Tˆ must not involve Bruce. Further-
more, Tˆ should assign the sensitive values in the first, second, and third QI-groups
in T ∗2 to {Ann, Bob}, {Cate, Don}, and {Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera}, respectively. To-
tally, there are 2!× 2!×4!= 96 different combinations between the sensitive values
and individuals. This leads to a set Sm of 96 possible microdata instances. For
any v = gastritis, flu, dyspepsia, or diabetes, there exist 24 instances in Sm that
associate Ed with v. Since Sm includes all possible microdata instances that can
be generalized to T ∗2 , we have S
+ ⊆ Sm.
Next, we will prove S+ = Sm. For this purpose, it suffices to establish that,
for any instance Tˆ ∈ Sm, T ∗2 is a minimal 2-diverse generalization with respect to
global recoding and the MBR function f . Let G1 = {Ann, Bob}, G2 = {Cate, Don},
G3 = {Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera}. The partition underlying T ∗2 is P1 = {G1, G2, G3}.
Assume, on the contrary, that T ∗2 is not minimal for some Tˆ ∈ Sm. Then, there
exists a partition P2 of Tˆ such that (i) P2 is a child of P1, and (ii) P2 and f decide
a 2-diverse global recoding generalization.
As P2 is a child of P1, by Definition 6, we can obtain P2 from P1 by splitting
G1, G2, or G3. However, it is impossible to split G1 (G2) into 2-diverse QI-groups,
since it contains only two tuples. On the other hand, G3 cannot be divided either.
This is because, Fred, Gill, and Hera have identical QI values, and thus, have to be
in the same QI-group (due to global recoding); meanwhile, the remaining tuple Ed
itself does not make a 2-diverse QI-group. Hence, under global recoding, no child
of P1 can lead to a 2-diverse generalization of Tˆ . It follows that T
∗
2 is a minimal
generalization of every Tˆ ∈ Sm, i.e., S+ = Sm.
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Finally, since (as mentioned earlier) there exist exactly 24 instances in Sm that
assign the same sensitive value to Ed, cred(Ed) = maxv∈As |S+o,v|/|S
+| = 24/96 =
1/4. 
Since the credibility model cannot secure privacy against an adversary who knows
the anonymization algorithm, any method developed based on the model is sus-
ceptible to revere engineering attacks. To demonstrate this, we exemplify in the
electronic appendix an attack against Mask, an anonymization approach devised in
[Wong et al. 2007] under the credibility model.
Comparison with [Zhang et al. 2007]. Zhang et al. [2007] consider the pub-
lication of microdata using deterministic algorithms that adopt global recoding.
They model a global recoding generalization as a projection of the microdata into
a “coarsened” multi-dimensional domain. For example, given the microdata T1 in
Table I, we can coarsen the Age domain, so that it contains only seven values:
“≤ 20”, “[21, 27]”, “(27, 32)”, “32”, “(32, 54)”, “[54, 60]”, and “≥ 60”. Similarly,
we can define a coarsened Zipcode domain that has only seven values: “< 10k”,
“[10k, 18k]”, “(18k, 35k)”, “35k”, “(35k, 60k)”, “[60k, 63k]”, and “> 63k”. Accord-
ingly, the global recoding generalization T ∗2 in Table III can be regarded as the
projection of T1 into the three-dimensional domain spanned by Disease and the
coarsened Age and Zipcode. Let C be the set of all coarsened multi-dimensional
domains that can be constructed from the attributes in the microdata. Zhang et
al. assume that the domains in C can be totally ordered by their information loss,
which measures the degree of coarseness of the domains. For example, the informa-
tion loss of a domain is (i) minimized if no coarsening is applied, and (ii) maximized
if every attribute is maximally coarsened.
Zhang et al. consider that the publisher adopts a deterministic generalization al-
gorithm G as follows. Given a microdata T and a privacy principle, G first examines
the multi-dimensional domains in C in ascending order of their information loss.
For each domain D∗, G projects T into D∗, and checks whether the resulting gener-
alization satisfies the given privacy principle. If the principle is satisfied, G returns
the generalization and terminates; otherwise, G moves on to the next domain in
C. In other words, G always outputs the first generalization that conforms to the
adopted privacy principle. Alternatively, G may also traverse C in descending order
of information loss, and returns the last generalization on which the given principle
is satisfied. The adversary is assumed to (i) have an external source E that contains
only the individuals in the microdata, and (ii) know the privacy principle as well
as the order in which G traverses C.
Under the above problem setting, Zhang et al. present a theoretical study on how
G should be designed to prevent the adversary from inferring private information.
Let np be the total number of possible microdata instances based on E. Zhang et al.
first prove that it is NP-hard (with respect to np) to compute a generalization that
both ensures privacy and incurs the minimum information loss. After that, they
investigate three special cases of the problem by imposing various constraints on C
and the privacy principle. For each case, they show that the optimal generalization
can be computed in time polynomial in np and the size of C. Finally, they propose
a generalization algorithm that ensures entropy l-diversity (see Section 2.1), and
prove that its time complexity is polynomial in |C| and independent of np. Note
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that, in practice, both |C| and np are usually exponential in the number n of tuples
in the microdata.
Compared with the solution in [Wong et al. 2007], Zhang et al.’s techniques
achieve a higher level of privacy protection, as they can guard against an adversary
who has full knowledge of the anonymization algorithm. Nevertheless, Zhang et
al.’s work has the following limitations. First, the privacy model in [Zhang et al.
2007] is restricted to a particular type of deterministic algorithms that adopt global
recoding. Consequently, the model cannot be used to evaluate the privacy guaran-
tee of any existing anonymization algorithm that is randomized or local-recoding-
based, nor does it support the development of new anonymization approaches of
those kinds. Second, all algorithms proposed in [Zhang et al. 2007] have time com-
plexities exponential in the number n of tuples in the microdata, and there is no
experimental evaluation included in [Zhang et al. 2007] to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness or efficiency of the algorithms. This leaves open the question of whether
or not the algorithms in [Zhang et al. 2007] are applicable in practice.
Our work remedies the deficiencies of [Zhang et al. 2007]. In particular, our
privacy model captures all (deterministic or randomized) anonymization algorithms
that adopt generalization or anatomy. This general model enables us to design three
transparent anonymization algorithms, all of which fall beyond Zhang et al.’s model
as they rely on random choices and/or local recoding. In addition, as will be shown
in Section 3, our algorithms run in O(n2 logn) time, which significantly improves
over the exponential time complexities of Zhang et al.’s techniques. Finally, we
will present in Section 4 an extensive experimental study that demonstrates the
practical performance of our algorithms in terms of data utility and computation
time.
3. ACHIEVING TRANSPARENT L-DIVERSITY
Equipped with the analytical model in Section 2, our next step is to develop trans-
parent anonymization algorithms for l-diversity. Ideally, an algorithm should pro-
duce anonymizations with minimum information loss, according to a certain penalty
metric h. Specifically, h is a function that, given a QI-group G, calculates a penalty
h(G) based on the tuples in G. Given h, the information loss of an anonymization
T ∗ is computed as
∑
G∈P h(G), where P is the partition underlying T
∗. For exam-
ple, the discernability metric deployed in Example 2 corresponds to a function hd
such that hd(G) = |G|2 for any QI-group G.
In the following, we will elaborate three transparent algorithms, each of which
can be combined with any penalty metric h, as long as the metric (i) does not
rely on the sensitive values in the input QI-group, and (ii) is superadditive, i.e.,
h(G1 ∪G2) ≥ h(G1) + h(G2) holds for any disjoint QI-groups G1 and G2. For our
discussion, we use the perimeter function hp [Ghinita et al. 2007; Iyengar 2002] as
a representative:
hp(G) = |G| ·
d∑
i=1
maxt∈G
{
t[Aqi ]
}
−mint∈G
{
t[Aqi ]
}
max
{
Aqi
}
−min
{
Aqi
} . (4)
Given a set SG of QI-groups, we refer to
∑
G∈SG
hp(G) as the perimeter of SG.
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3.1 The Tailor Algorithm
3.1.1 Algorithm Description. This section presents a transparent algorithm,
Tailor, which produces anonymized tables in a manner similar to the construc-
tion of kd-trees [Friedman et al. 1977]. Tailor requires the microdata T to be
l-eligible. That is, at most |T |/l tuples in T have the same sensitive value. If
T is not l-eligible, Tailor returns ∅, since no l-diverse anonymization of T exists
[Machanavajjhala et al. 2007].
Given an l-eligible T , Tailor first creates a partition P with only one QI-group
G0, which includes all tuples in T . As a second step, Tailor tries to split G0 into
two l-diverse subsets G1 and G2 subject to certain constraints to be clarified later.
If splitting is possible, Tailor removes G0 from P , and inserts G1 and G2 in P . This
decreases the perimeter of P . After that, Tailor recursively splits a QI-group in
P , until no QI-group can be divided further, i.e., the perimeter of P has reached a
local minimum. Then, Tailor terminates, and outputs the anonymization decided
by P and an anonymization function (e.g., the MBR function).
Whenever Tailor divides a QI-group G into subsets Ga and Gb, {Ga, Gb} must
be an l-cut:
Definition 9 (l-Cut). Let G be a QI-group, l be a positive integer, and c be
the maximum number of tuples in G with the same sensitive value. An l-cut of G
on Aqi (i ∈ [1, d]) is an ordered set {Ga, Gb} of QI-groups, such that:
(1 ) Ga ∪Gb = G, and Ga ∩Gb = ∅.
(2 ) |Ga| ≥ l · c and |Gb| ≥ l · c.
(3 ) For any ta ∈ Ga and tb ∈ Gb, either (i) ta[A
q
i ] < tb[A
q
i ], or (ii) ta[A
q
i ] = tb[A
q
i ]
and ta[A
id] < tb[A
id].
The perimeter of the l-cut is the total perimeter of Ga and Gb.
Condition 2 in Definition 9 implies that G (on which the l-cut is performed) is
2l-diverse. Condition 3 requires, intuitively, that all tuples in Ga must precede
those in Gb, along the dimension A
q
i on which G is divided.
Interestingly, as long as G is 2l-diverse, there exists at least one l-cut on any
QI-attribute Aqi (i ∈ [1, d]). Such a cut can be found as follows. First, we sort the
tuples in G in ascending order of their Aqi values. In case two tuples have the same
value on Aqi , the tuple with a smaller identifier precedes the other. Then, we create
Ga by including the first k tuples in the sorted sequence (for any k ∈
[
l ·c, |G|−l ·c
]
),
and construct Gb using the remaining tuples.
The above strategy yields totally d ·(|G|+1−2l ·c) different l-cuts. Among them,
Tailor always selects the canonical one:
Definition 10 (Canonical l-Cut). The canonical l-cut of a QI-group G is
the l-cut with the smallest perimeter. In case multiple l-cuts have the smallest
parameter, the canonical l-cut {Ga, Gb} is uniquely decided as follows. Assume
{Ga, Gb} is on dimension A
q
i (i ∈ [1, d]); then:
(1 ) No l-cut on any Aqj (j < i) has the same perimeter as {Ga, Gb}.
(2 ) For any l-cut {G′a, G
′
b} on A
q
i , if {G
′
a, G
′
b} and {Ga, Gb} have the same perime-
ter, it must hold that |Ga| < |G
′
a|.
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Algorithm Tailor (T , l)
1. if T is not l-eligible then return ∅
2. G0 = a QI-group containing all tuples in T , and P = {G0}
3. while there exists a 2l-diverse QI-group G in P
4. {Ga, Gb} = the canonical l-cut of G
5. P = P − {G}+ {Ga, Gb}
6. return the anonymization decided by P and an anonymization fucntion
Fig. 3. The Tailor algorithm
Name Age Zipcode Disease 
Ann 21 10000 dyspepsia 
Bob 27 18000 flu 
Cate 32 35000 gastritis 
Don 32 35000 gastritis 
Ed 54 60000 flu 
Fred 60 63000 bronchitis 
Gill 60 63000 dyspepsia 
Hera 60 63000 diabetes 
 
Table VIII. Microdata T5
Age Zipcode Disease 
[21, 32] [10k, 35k] dyspepsia 
[21, 32] [10k, 35k] flu 
[21, 32] [10k, 35k] gastritis 
[21, 32] [10k, 35k] gastritis 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] flu 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] bronchitis 
60 63000 dyspepsia 
60 63000 diabetes 
 
Table IX. Generalization T ∗6
Note that the canonical l-cut of a QI-group G is determined by (i) the identifiers
and QI values in G, as well as (ii) the maximum number c of tuples in G with the
same sensitive value – all of this information is independent of the concrete sensitive
value of any particular tuple. This property is the key to ensuring transparent l-
diversity, as will be discussed in Section 3.1.2.
Figure 3 shows the pseudo-code of Tailor. We demonstrate the algorithm with
an example, assuming that the MBR function is adopted.
Example 4. Let us use Tailor to obtain a transparently 2-diverse generalization
of the microdata T5 in Table VIII (i.e., T = T5 and l = 2). Tailor first verifies that
T5 is 2-eligible (Line 1 in Figure 3), and then initializes a partition P = {G0},
where G0 = T5 (Line 2). The subsequent execution of Tailor is in iterations (Lines
3-5). In each iteration, Tailor looks for a 4 (= 2l) diverse QI-group G in P (Line
3). If G does not exist, Tailor terminates, and returns the generalization decided
by P (Line 6). Otherwise, Tailor splits G using its canonical l-cut (Lines 4-5), and
replaces G with the new QI-groups.
Specifically, in the first iteration, the only QI-group G0 in P is 4-diverse, and
hence, is chosen to be split. Tailor identifies c = 2, which, as in Definition 9, is
the largest number of tuples in G0 having the same sensitive value. Then, Tailor
proceeds to find the canonical 2-cut of G0. For this purpose, it needs to obtain the
best 2-cut (with the smallest perimeter) along every dimension. Dealing with Age
first, Tailor sorts the tuples in G0 by their Age values, and tries all possibilities of
dividing the sorted list into two parts, each with at least 4 (= 2c) tuples (required
by condition 2 in Definition 9). There is only possibility: {G2, G3}, where G2 =
{Ann, Bob, Cate, Don}, and G3 = {Ed, Fred, Gill, Hera}. Hence, {G2, G3} is the
best 2-cut on Age. Switching to dimension Zipcode, Tailor sorts the tuples in G0 by
their Zipcode values, and again, attempts all division possibilities. Again, {G2, G3}
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is the only possibility, and hence, is also the best 2-cut on Zipcode. Hence, {G2, G3}
is the canonical 2-cut. Tailor thus replaces G0 with G2 and G3 in P .
In the second iteration, P = {G2, G3}. As G2 is not 4-diverse, it cannot be
split. But G3 is 4-diverse, and thus, is split using its canonical cut {G4, G5}, where
G4 = {Ed, Fred} and G5 = {Gill, Hera}. Now, P becomes {G2, G4, G5}. Since
no QI-group is 4-diverse, Tailor returns the generalization T ∗6 determined by P , as
shown in Table IX. 
Tailor is deterministic, i.e., for any T , l, and T ∗, Pr{Tailor(T, l) = T ∗} (see
Proposition 1) equals either 0 or 1. In addition, Tailor has an O(n2 logn) time
complexity, where n is the number of tuples in T . This follows from the facts that
(i) Tailor performs at most n/l l-cuts on T , and (ii) each l-cut takes O(n log n)
time.
3.1.2 Proof of Transparent l-Diversity. In this section, we will prove that Tailor
ensures transparent l-diversity. The core of our proof is an analysis on the set S
of all possible microdata instances based on the adversary’s external source E. We
will show that S can be divided into several subsets, such that for each subset
Ssub, (i) all instances in Ssub can be transformed to the same anonymization T
∗ by
Tailor, and (ii) each individual in E is assigned many different sensitive values in
different instances in Ssub. Intuitively, when the adversary observes T
∗, s/he would
not be able to infer which instance in Ssub is the real microdata, and hence, the
sensitive value of each individual can be concealed.
More specifically, our analysis exploits the isomorphism between partitions. We
say that a partition P1 of a possible microdata instance is isomorphic to a partition
P2 of another instance, if and only if each QI-group in P1 is isomorphic to a QI-group
in P2, and vice versa (see Section 2.1 for the definition of QI-group isomorphism).
Example 5. Consider the partition P of T5 (in Table VIII) generated by Tailor
in Example 4. P contains three QI-groups, namely, G2= {Ann, Bob, Cate, Don},
G4 = {Ed, Fred}, and G5 = {Gill, Hera}. The sensitive values of Ed and Fred are
flu and bronchitis, respectively. Suppose that we modify the two tuples in G4 by
swapping their Disease values, such that Ed has bronchitis and Fred has flu. The
resulting QI-group G′4 is isomorphic to G4, while the partition P
′ = {G2, G′4, G5}
isomorphic to P . Note that P ′ is not a partition of T5, but is in fact a partition of
the microdata T3 in Table IV (this will be useful in demonstrating Lemma 3 later).

Recall that, for any anonymization function f and any two isomorphic QI-groups
G1 and G2, we have f(G1) = f(G2) (see Definition 1). Therefore, once f is fixed,
isomorphic partitions always lead to the same anonymization. For instance, con-
sider the partitions P and P ′ in Example 5. Notice that, P ′ and the MBR function
decide T ∗6 (in Table IX), which is determined by P and the MBR function as well.
In addition, isomorphic QI-groups have a crucial property:
Lemma 2. Let G and G′ be two isomorphic QI-groups, and {G1, G2} ({G
′
1, G
′
2})
be the canonical l-cut of G (G′). Then, G1 and G
′
1 (G2 and G
′
2) must involve the
same set of individuals.
The above lemma is fairly intuitive. Recall that, the canonical l-cut of a QI-
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group G depends only on the identifiers and QI values in G, and is independent of
the sensitive values. Since isomorphic QI-groups contain equivalent identifiers and
QI values, their canonical l-cuts divide them in the same way, and thus Lemma 2
holds. Based on Lemma 2, we derive the following result, which shows an important
characteristic of Tailor.
Lemma 3. Let T1 be a microdata table, l be an integer, and T
∗ = Tailor(T1, l).
Let P1 be the partition of T1 that decides T
∗, P2 be a partition isomorphic to P1,
and T2 =
⋃
G∈P2
G. Then, Tailor(T2, l) = T
∗, and P2 is the partition of T2 that
decides T ∗.
For instance, consider the microdata T3, T5 and the partitions P , P
′ in Example 5.
We have shown in Example 4 that Tailor(T5, 2) = T
∗
6 , where T
∗
6 is decided by P .
Recall that P ′ is isomorphic to P , and T3 =
⋃
G∈P ′ G. According to Lemma 3, we
have Tailor(T3, 2) = T
∗
6 , i.e., given l = 2, Tailor transforms both T3 and T5 into
T ∗6 .
The following theorem shows a sufficient condition for transparent l-diversity.
Theorem 1. An l-diversity algorithm G is transparent if it satisfies the following
condition: For any microdata T1 such that G(T1, l) = T ∗, we have G(T2, l) = T ∗
for a microdata table T2, if T2 has a partition isomorphic to the partition of T1 that
decides T ∗.
By Lemma 3, Tailor satisfies the sufficient condition in Theorem 1, which proves
that Tailor is a transparent algorithm.
3.2 The Ace Algorithm
This section discusses another algorithm, Ace (assign and slice), which first ap-
peared in [Xiao and Tao 2007] as part of a solution to anonymizing dynamic
datasets. Here, we present non-trivial proofs on the privacy guarantee ofAce against
adversaries who have full knowledge of the algorithm.
3.2.1 Algorithm Description. Let us first introduce several concepts. Given a
QI-group B, we define the signature of B as the set of sensitive values in B. A
column of B refers to a maximal set of tuples in B with the same sensitive value.
B is a bucket, if all of its columns contain an equal number of tuples. A partition
U is a bucket partition, if each QI-group in U is a bucket.
For example, consider a QI-group B1 of the microdata T5 in Table VIII, where
B1 = {Ann, Bob, Ed, Gill}. The signature of B1 is {dyspepsia, flu}. B1 contains
two columns, L1 = {Ann, Gill} and L2 = {Bob, Ed}, where all tuples in L1 (L2)
have sensitive value dyspepsia (flu). Since |L1| = |L2|, B1 is a bucket. Let B2 and
B3 be another two QI-groups of T5, such that B2 = {Don, Fred} and B3 = {Cate,
Hera}. It can be verified that, B2 and B3 are also buckets. Therefore, the partition
U1 = {B1, B2, B3} is a bucket partition of T5. Figure 4 illustrates U1.
Apparently, U1 is 2-diverse. Suppose that we divide B1 into two smaller buckets,
B4 = {Ann, Bob} and B5 = {Gill, Ed}, both having the same signature as B1. The
partition U ′1 = {B2, B3, B4, B5} is also 2-diverse, and has a lower perimeter than
U1. In general, given any l-diverse bucket partition U , we may reduce its perimeter
by splitting the buckets in U , without violating l-diversity. This strategy is adopted
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Ann Bob
Gill Ed
dyspepsia flu
B1
Don Fred
gastritis bronchitis
B2
Hera Cate
diabetes gastritis
B3
Fig. 4. Bucket Partition U1
by Ace. In particular, whenever Ace splits a bucket B, the resulting sub-buckets
always constitute a division of B, as defined below:
Definition 11 (Division). A division of a bucket B on Aqi (i ∈ [1, d]) is an
ordered set {Ba, Bb} of buckets, such that:
(1 ) Ba ∪Bb = B, and Ba ∩Bb = ∅.
(2 ) B, Ba and Bb have an identical signature.
(3 ) For any two tuples ta ∈ Ba and tb ∈ Bb with the same sensitive value, we have
either (i) ta[A
q
i ] < tb[A
q
i ], or (ii) ta[A
q
i ] = tb[A
q
i ] and ta[A
id] < tb[A
id].
The perimeter of the division equals the perimeter of {Ba, Bb}. A bucket is di-
visible, if each of its columns has at least two tuples.
Given a bucket B with x columns, we can obtain a division {Ba, Bb} of B on A
q
i
(i ∈ [1, d]) as follows. First, we sort the tuples in each column of B in ascending
order of their Aqi values. Whenever two tuples have an identical value on A
q
i ,
the tuple with a smaller identifier precedes the other. This results in x sorted
sequences. To construct Ba, we can remove an equal number of tuples from the
top of each sequence, and insert them into Ba. After that, Bb can be formed using
the remaining tuples.
A bucket may have multiple divisions. In a way similar to canonical l-cuts, we
formulate canonical division as:
Definition 12 (Canonical Division). The canonical division of a bucket
B is the division with the smallest perimeter. In case multiple divisions have the
smallest perimeter, the canonical division {Ba, Bb} is uniquely decided as follows.
Assume {Ba, Bb} is on dimension A
q
i (i ∈ [1, d]); then:
(1 ) No division on any Aqj (j < i) has the same perimeter as {Ba, Bb}.
(2 ) For any division {B′a, B
′
b} on A
q
i , if {Ba, Bb} and {B
′
a, B
′
b} have the same
perimeter, it must hold that |Ba| < |B
′
a|.
As with canonical l-cuts, the canonical division of a bucket B is irrelevant to the
sensitive values in B. Instead, it is decided only by the identifiers and QI values
in each column. In Section 3.2.2, we will exploit this property to prove that Ace is
transparent.
Figure 5 illustrates the pseudo-code of Ace. Given a microdata T and a positive
integer l, Ace first verifies whether T is l-eligible. After that, it invokes a subroutine
Assign (in Figure 6) to construct an l-diverse bucket partition U of T . Next, Ace
employs the Slice algorithm (in Figure 8) to split the buckets in U , and obtains a
refined partition U ′ of T . In particular, the construction of U is performed without
inspecting the QI values of the tuples, while the split of each bucket in U is based
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Algorithm Ace (T , l)
1. if T is not l-eligible then return ∅
2. U = Assign(T, l)
3. U ′ = Slice(U)
4. return the generalization decided by U ′ and an anonymization function
Fig. 5. The Ace algorithm
on canonical divisions, which are independent of the sensitive value in each column
of the bucket. In other words, Assign and Slice do not rely on the correlations
between the QI and sensitive values, which helps achieve transparent l-diversity.
Finally, Ace returns the generalization decided by U ′. In the following, we explain
the details of Ace with an example, assuming that the MBR function is adopted.
Example 6. Assume that we apply Ace on the microdata T5 in Table VIII, with
l = 2. Ace begins by checking whether T5 is l-eligible. Since T5 is 2-eligible, Ace
invokes Assign to construct a bucket partition U of T5.
Assign first sets U = ∅, and creates a set St containing all tuples in T5 (Lines
1-3 in Figure 6). After that, Assign iteratively removes tuples from St to construct
buckets in U , until St is empty (Lines 4-13). In each iteration, Assign first counts
the frequency of each sensitive value in St (Lines 5-6), and then builds a bucket
B, such that (i) the signature of B consists of the β most frequent sensitive values
in St, and (ii) each column of B contains α tuples in St. The values of α and β
are decided in Lines 7-10, which, as explained in [Xiao and Tao 2007], guarantee
that (i) β ≥ l, (ii) α ≥ 1, and (iii) Assign always terminates5. For our discussion,
it suffices to know that, α and β depend only on the size of St and the sensitive
values in St. Since β ≥ l, any bucket B created by Assign is l-diverse.
In the first iteration, St = T5, and α = β = 2 (calculated by Lines 7-10).
Figure 7(a) illustrates the tuples in St. Assign first creates a bucket B1 whose
signature consists of the β = 2 most frequent sensitive values in St. As shown in
Figure 7(a), there exist three sensitive values in St, dyspepsia, flu, and gastritis, that
have the same highest frequency. To pick two of the three diseases, Assign resorts
to a total ordering. In general, any total ordering works, but for our illustration, we
use the alphabetic order, in which case the signature of B1 is selected as {dyspepsia,
flu}. Next, for each disease in the signature, Assign adds α = 2 tuples to B1. As
a consequence, B1 contains four tuples {Ann, Bob, Gill, Ed}, as illustrated in
Figure 4. The tuples in B1 are then removed from St.
In the second iteration, St contains four tuples, as shown in Figure 7(b). This
time, α = 1 and β = 2. Hence, Assign yields a bucket B2 with signature {gastritis,
bronchitis} (gastritis is picked as it has the highest frequency in St; bronchitis is
chosen because it alphabetically ranks before diabetes). Accordingly, Assign inserts
two tuples into B2: one with a sensitive value gastritis, and the other one with
bronchitis. As there are two tuples having bronchitis, the one to appear in B2 is
randomly chosen; suppose that we pick Don. This leads to B2 = {Don, Fred},
5Intuitively, Assign always terminates, because (i) each iteration of Assign removes α·β > 0 tuples
from St, and hence, (ii) St will become empty after a certain number of iterations, in which case
Assign stops by returning the bucket partition U it constructs (see Lines 3 and 13 in Figure 6).
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Algorithm Assign (T , l)
1. initialize a partition U = ∅
2. w = the number of distinct As value in T
3. St = T
/∗ The tuples in St will be iteratively removed to construct buckets in U ∗/
4. while St 6= ∅
/∗ Lines 5-12 create a new bucket in U using tuples from St ∗/
5. let vi (i ∈ [1, w]) be the i-th most frequent A
s value in the current St
/∗ Ties are resolved by a total ordering on As (see Example 6) ∗/
6. let ni (i ∈ [1, w]) be the number of tuples in St with sensitive value vi
7. β = l
/∗ the new bucket’s signature will contain the β most frequent As values in St ∗/
8. α = the largest positive integer satisfying three inequalities:
α ≤ nβ , n1 − α ≤
|St|−α·β
l
, and nβ+1 ≤
|St|−α·β
l
/∗ the new bucket will contain α tuples for each sensitive value in its signature ∗/
8. if α does not exist
9. β = β + 1; goto Line 7
10. create in U a bucket B with a signature {v1, ..., vβ}
11. for i = 1 to β
12. from St, randomly remove α tuples whose sensitive values equal vi, and insert
those tuples into B
13. return U
Fig. 6. The Assign algorithm
Tuples in St
Fred (bronchitis)
Hera (diabetes)
Ann, Gill (dyspepsia)
Bob, Ed (flu)
Cate, Don (gastritis)
(a) Before B1 Is Constructed
Tuples in St
Fred (bronchitis)
Hera (diabetes)
Cate, Don (gastritis)
(b) Before B2 Is Constructed
Tuples in St
Hera (diabetes)
Cate (gastritis)
(c) Before B3 Is Constructed
Fig. 7. Changes in St During the Execution of Assign in Example 6
Algorithm Slice (U)
1. while there exists a divisible bucket B in U
2. {Ba, Bb} = the canonical division of B
3. U = U − {B}+ {Ba, Bb}
4. return U
Fig. 8. The Slice algorithm
as illustrated in Figure 4. Don and Fred are then evicted from St, as shown in
Figure 7(c).
Similarly, the third iteration constructs a bucket B3 = {Hera, Cate} (see Fig-
ure 4). Then, St becomes empty, and hence, Assign terminates with a bucket
partition U={B1, B2, B3}.
As the second step, Ace applies Slice to divide the buckets in U into smaller QI-
groups. Slice also runs in iterations. In each iteration, it first identifies a divisible
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
22 ·
Age Zipcode Disease 
[21, 27] [10k, 18k] dyspepsia 
[21, 27] [10k, 18k] flu 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] dyspepsia 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] flu 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] gastritis 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] bronchitis 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] diabetes 
[32, 60] [35k, 63k] gastritis 
 
Table X. Generalization T ∗7
Name Age Zipcode Disease 
Ann 21 10000 flu 
Bob 27 18000 dyspepsia 
Cate 32 35000 gastritis 
Don 32 35000 gastritis 
Ed 54 60000 dyspepsia 
Fred 60 63000 bronchitis 
Gill 60 63000 flu 
Hera 60 63000 diabetes 
 
Table XI. Microdata T8
bucket B in U (Line 1 in Figure 8), and then, splits B using its canonical division
{Ba, Bb}. This is repeated until no bucket in U is divisible.
In our example, the input to Slice is the bucket partition U = {B1, B2, B3} in
Figure 4. B1 is the only divisible bucket. To determine the canonical division of B1,
Slice finds the best division on each dimension (with the lowest perimeter). It turns
out that, on both dimensions Age and Zipcode, the best division is {B4, B5}, where
B4 = {Ann, Bob} and B5 = {Gill, Ed}. Thus, {B4, B5} becomes the canonical
division. Therefore, Slice removes B1 from U , and inserts B4 and B5 instead,
leading to U = {B2, B3, B4, B5}. As no bucket in U is divisible, Slice returns U to
Ace. Finally, Ace reports the generalization T ∗7 (in Table X) decided by U . 
Ace is a randomized algorithm, due to the randomness in its component Assign.
Furthermore, Ace has an O(n2 logn) time complexity, where n is the number of
tuples in T . To understand this, observe that Assign runs in O(n) time (we regard
the number of distinct As values in T as a constant). On the other hand, Slice
has an O(n2 logn) time complexity, since (i) each bucket B generated from Assign
is divided by Slice exactly |B|/l times, (ii) each division of B incurs O(|B| log |B|)
overhead, and (iii) the sizes of all buckets add up to n. Since Ace is a composition
of Assign and Slice, its time complexity is O(n2 logn).
3.2.2 Proof of Transparent l-Diversity. This section proves that Ace achieves
transparent l-diversity. Our analysis utilizes a crucial concept, the symmetry be-
tween buckets.
Definition 13 (Symmetry). Two buckets B1 and B2 are symmetric, if and
only if (i) B1 and B2 have the same signature, and (ii) for any column L1 ⊆
B1, there exists a column L2 ⊆ B2, such that L1 and L2 involve the same set of
individuals. Two bucket partitions U1 and U2 are symmetric, if each bucket in U1
is symmetric to a bucket in U2, and vice versa.
Consider, for example, the bucket partition U1 in Figure 4. Bucket B1 ∈ U1
contains two columns L1 = {Ann, Gill} and L2 = {Bob, Ed}. Suppose that we
exchange the sensitive values between L1 and L2, by setting the sensitive values of
the tuples in L1 (L2) to flu (dyspepsia). Then, we obtain a bucket B
′
1 symmetric
to B1, as shown in Figure 9. The bucket partition U2 = {B′1, B2, B3} is symmetric
to U1. In general, we can obtain any symmetric counterpart of a bucket B, by
swapping the sensitive values between different columns of B.
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Bob Ann
Ed Gill
dyspepsia flu
B′1
Don Fred
gastritis bronchitis
B2
Hera Cate
diabetes gastritis
B3
Fig. 9. Bucket partition U2
Interestingly, the canonical division of a symmetric bucket always results in sym-
metric sub-buckets:
Lemma 4. Let B and B′ be two symmetric buckets, and {B1, B2} ({B′1, B
′
2}) be
the canonical division of B (B′). Then, B1 and B
′
1 (B2 and B
′
2) are symmetric.
The rationale behind Lemma 4 is similar to that of Lemma 2. Specifically, since
B and B′ are symmetric, each column L in B can be mapped to a column L′ in B′,
such that L and L′ involve an identical set of identifiers and QI values. Recall that
the canonical division of a bucket depends only on identifiers and QI-values, and
is irrelevant to sensitive values. Hence, the canonical division of B has the same
effect as that of B′, thus establishing Lemma 4. The lemma naturally leads to the
following result.
Lemma 5. Let U1 and U2 be two symmetric bucket partitions. Let U
′
1 = Slice(U1)
and U ′2 = Slice(U2). Then, U
′
1 and U
′
2 are symmetric.
Assign also has an interesting property related to symmetric buckets:
Lemma 6. Let T1 be a microdata table, l an integer, and U1 a possible output of
Assign(T1, l). Let U2 be a bucket partition symmetric to U1, and T2 =
⋃
B∈U2
B.
Then, Pr
{
Assign(T1, l) = U1
}
= Pr
{
Assign(T2, l)=U2
}
.
For instance, consider the symmetric bucket partitions U1 and U2 in Figures 4
and 9, respectively. U1 (U2) is a partition of the microdata T5 in Table VIII (T8 in
Table XI). By Lemma 6, the probability that Assign(T5, 2) returns U1 equals the
probability that Assign(T8, 2) outputs U2.
We prove that Ace ensures transparent l-diversity by combining Lemmas 5 and
6 with the following theorem, which states a sufficient condition for transparent
l-diversity.
Theorem 2. Let GA and GB be two algorithms as follows:
(1 ) GA takes as input a microdata table T1 and a positive integer l, and outputs a
bucket partition U1 of T1, such that for any bucket partition U2 symmetric to
U1, we have Pr
{
GA(T1, l) = U1
}
= Pr
{
GA(T2, l)=U2
}
, where T2 =
⋃
B∈U2
B.
(2 ) GB is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a bucket partition U and
outputs another bucket partition, such that for any bucket partition U ′ symmet-
ric to U , GB(U) is always symmetric to GB(U ′).
Let G be an l-diversity algorithm that first applies GA on the input microdata,
then invokes GB on the bucket partition output from GA, and finally returns the
anonymization decided by the bucket partition generated from GB. G is transparent.
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
24 ·
Algorithm Hybrid (T , l)
1. if T is not l-eligible then return ∅
2. G0 = a QI-group containing all tuples in T , and P = {G0}
3. while there exists a 2l-diverse QI-group G in P
4. {Ga, Gb} = the canonical l-cut of G
5. P = P − {G}+ {Ga, Gb}
6. T ∗ = ∅
7. for each QI-group Gi ∈ P
8. T ∗i = Ace(Gi, l)
9. T ∗ = T ∗ ∪ T ∗i
10. return T ∗
Fig. 10. The Hybrid algorithm
By Lemma 6 (Lemma 5), Assign (Slice) satisfies the requirements for GA (GB)
stated in Theorem 2; therefore, Ace (as a combination of Assign and Slice) is a
transparent algorithm.
3.3 The Hybrid Algorithm
This section develops a new algorithm Hybrid that combines Tailor and Ace. Hybrid
is motivated by, and overcomes the drawbacks of, Tailor and Ace. We will first
explain those drawbacks, and then, elaborate the details of Hybrid.
Given a microdata T and an integer l, Tailor initiates a partition P = {T }, and
then iteratively refines P , by splitting the QI-groups of P into smaller ones. How-
ever, once a QI-group violates 2l-diversity, it is ignored by Tailor, even if it can be
further divided. As a result, Tailor sometimes spawns QI-groups with many tuples,
entailing high information loss. For example, consider the 2-diverse generalization
T ∗6 (Table IX), which is produced by Tailor in Example 4. The first QI-group G1
in T ∗6 has four tuples {Ann, Bob, Cate, Don} in T5 (Table VIII). In fact, G1 can
be further split into 2-diverse QI-groups {Ann, Cate} and {Bob, Don}. Tailor fails
to see the split because G1 is not 4-diverse.
Ace does not suffer from the above defect, but its random nature may occasionally
create poor QI-groups. Recall that, Ace employs Assign to obtain an l-diverse
bucket partition U of T . Let us revisit the way Assign builds a bucket B in U :
Assign first decides the signature of B, and then determines each column in B, using
tuples randomly selected from T . The distribution of QI values in each column of
B may vary significantly. For instance, in Example 6, Assign generates a bucket B3
with signature {diabetes, gastritis}. Diabetes usually affects people over 40, while
gastritis is common for all ages. Therefore, when Assign constructs the diabetes
column, the random samples from T are likely to have large Age values. In contrast,
the gastritis column may contain individuals with any ages.
This (QI-distribution) difference becomes problematic in Slice, which Ace deploys
to refine the bucket partition U output by Assign. As explained in Section 3.2.1,
Slice splits each bucket B ∈ U into non-divisible buckets (a.k.a QI-groups), each
of which has exactly one tuple from every column of B. If the columns of B
have diverse QI-distributions, the tuples in a final non-divisible QI-group may have
dissimilar QI values. After anonymization, such a QI-group would incur large
information loss.
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Age Gender Education Birthplace Occupation Income
Size 79 2 17 57 50 50
Table XII. Attribute domain sizes
Hybrid, as in Figure 10, remedies the deficiencies of Tailor and Ace by running
the two algorithms consecutively. Specifically, Hybrid first computes a partition P
of T using Tailor. In particular, Lines 1-5 in Figure 10 are identical to Lines 1-5 in
Figure 3. As the second step, Hybrid treats each QI-group in P as a tiny microdata
table, and invokes Ace to generalize the QI-group (Lines 6-10).
By employing Ace to refine P , Hybrid outputs QI-groups with (much) fewer
tuples than Tailor, thus avoiding the defect of Tailor. Meanwhile, compared to
Ace, Hybrid incurs lower information loss, by executing Ace on each QI-group in
P , where tuples already have similar QI values. The following theorem shows that
Hybrid is transparent.
Theorem 3. Let T be a microdata table, l be a positive integer, and T ∗ be
any possible output of Hybrid(T, l). Given any external source E for T , we have
risk(o) ≤ 1/l for any individual o.
Finally, we point out that Hybrid has an O(n2 log n) time complexity, where n
is the number of tuples in T . This follows from the O(n2 logn) complexity of both
Tailor and Ace.
4. EXPERIMENTS
In the earlier sections, we have proved the privacy guarantees of our transparent
algorithms. A natural question is, how do they compare with the existing solutions
in terms of data utility and computation overhead (remember that no previous
solution is transparent, i.e., it does not ensures anonymity, when an adversary
knows the algorithm details)? In the sequel, we answer this question with empirical
evidence that validates the effectiveness and efficiency of our algorithms. First,
Section 4.1 clarifies the experiment settings, and then Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present
detailed results.
4.1 Experimental Setting
Following previous work [Ghinita et al. 2007; Xiao and Tao 2007], we employ two
real-world datasets, OCC and SAL, extracted from the Integrated Public Use Mi-
crodata Series [Ruggles et al. 2004]. Both datasets consist of 600k tuples, each
containing the information of an American adult. OCC has a sensitive attribute
Occupation, and four QI attributes, Age, Gender, Education, and Birthplace. SAL
has the same QI attributes, but a different sensitive attribute Income. All attributes
have integer domains. Table XII presents their domain sizes.
We compare our techniques (adopting the MBR function) against two l-diversity
generalization algorithms, Mondrian [LeFevre et al. 2006a] and Mask [Wong et al.
2007]. The former is a popular technique in the literature [Byun et al. 2006; LeFevre
et al. 2006b; Nergiz et al. 2007; Pei et al. 2007], due to its simplicity and effective-
ness. Mask, on the other hand, is an existing approach that does not assume
adversaries with zero algorithm knowledge (nevertheless, as explained in Sections 1
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Parameter Values
l 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Query dimensionality qd 2, 3, 4, 5
Expected selectivity s 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%
Table XIII. Parameters and Tested Values
and 2.3, Mask is not transparent, as it can prevent only minimality attacks). We
apply each algorithm to compute l-diverse generalizations of OCC and SAL, using
various values of l6. Note that the generalizations produced by our solutions are
guaranteed to be transparent l-diverse, whereas those by the other methods are
not.
In accordance with [Ghinita et al. 2007; Wong et al. 2007; Xiao and Tao 2007],
we evaluate the utility of a generalized table T ∗ by using it to answer count queries
about the underlying microdata T . Each query has the form:
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM T
WHERE pred(Aq1) AND ... AND pred(A
q
4) AND pred(A
s)
where pred(A) denotes a predicate on A. Predicates are generated based on two
parameters: query dimensionality qd and expected selectivity s. Specifically, given
qd∈ [2, 5] and s∈(0, 1), we create a set SA that contains the sensitive attribute As
of T , and qd−1 QI attributes randomly selected. Then, for each A ∈ SA, we set
pred(A) to “A∈ I”, where I is a random interval on A, enclosing a fraction s1/qd
of the values in A. Finally, for each A′ /∈ SA, pred(A′) is “A′ = ∗”. By requiring
qd ≥ 2 and As ∈ SA, we aim to examine how well T
∗ preserves the correlation
between the QI and sensitive attributes.
On each generalized table, we process several query workloads, each of which
contains 1000 queries with identical qd and s. We gauge the utility of T ∗ by the av-
erage workload error computed as follows. For each query, we derive its exact result
act from T , and compute an estimated answer est from T ∗ using the approximation
technique in [LeFevre et al. 2006a]. The error of est is defined as |act−est|max{act,δ} , where
δ is set to 0.5% of the dataset cardinality. Then, the workload error equals the
average error of all queries in the workload. Note that δ is introduced to prevent
the workload error from being dominated by queries with exceedingly small results
(similar approaches are adopted in [Garofalakis and Kumar 2005; Vitter and Wang
1999]).
Table XIII summarizes the experiment parameters. Unless otherwise specified,
we always set the parameters to their default values, i.e., the bold numbers in
Table XIII. All experiments are performed on a computer with a 1.8GHz CPU and
1GB memory.
4.2 Utility of Generalization
The first set of experiments evaluates the information loss incurred by each algo-
rithm. Figure 11 illustrates the results as a function of l. As expected, the error
6Mask requires two parameters k and l (k ≥ l) to generate an l-diverse table. We set k = l in our
experiments, since a smaller k leads to a generalized table with higher utility, as shown in [Wong
et al. 2007].
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Fig. 11. Query Accuracy vs. l
Age Gender Education Birthplace
Occupation 0.49 0.62 0.28 0.38
Income 0.71 0.87 0.41 0.50
Table XIV. Correlation Ratio between Attributes
of all methods escalates with l, since a larger l implies a more stringent anonymity
requirement, which, in turn, demands more aggressive generalization. Hybrid and
Mondrian have the best overall performance. This is a strong evidence indicating
that the heuristics of Hybrid are highly effective. In particular, even though Hybrid
must guarantee transparency, it still offers almost the same utility compared to
Mondrian (which is non-transparent).
Tailor and Ace exhibit worse performance than Hybrid. This is not surprising
because, as mentioned in Section 3.3, Hybrid is designed to overcome the short-
comings of Tailor and Ace. Mask incurs larger error than Hybrid in all cases, even
though the former is vulnerable to adversaries with full algorithm knowledge (recall
that Mask prevents only minimality attacks).
Each algorithm demonstrates similar behavior regardless of the dataset, except
that Ace performs worse on SAL than on OCC. To explain this, we observe that
the incomes depend heavily on people’s ages and education. Hence, when Ace
employs Assign to create a partition U of SAL, each bucket in U contains tuples
with very different QI values, due to the reason explained in Section 3.3. As a result,
the QI-groups returned by Ace have long generalized intervals, rendering low data
utility. The above phenomenon does not exist on OCC because occupation is much
less correlated to the QI-attributes. To support our analysis, Table XIV shows the
correlation ratios [Kendall and Stuart 1979] between the QI and sensitive attributes
of OCC and SAL. A larger ratio indicates stronger correlation.
To study the influence of query dimensionality qd, Figure 12 plots the workload
error as a function of qd. The relative performance of alternative algorithms re-
mains the same as in Figure 11. In particular, Hybrid and Mondrian permit highly
accurate counting analysis; their maximum error is less than 10%. Each algorithm
has better query precision when the query dimensionality qd is higher. To under-
stand this, recall that each query predicate either includes the whole domain of
an attribute, or is an interval covering s1/qd of the domain. When s is fixed but
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Fig. 12. Query Accuracy vs. Query Dimensionality qd
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Fig. 13. Query Accuracy vs. Expected Selectivity s
qd increases, s1/qd becomes greater, implying wider query intervals, which lead to
smaller error, as explained in [Xiao and Tao 2006a]. Figure 13 shows the error when
the expected selectivity s grows from 2% to 10%. Again, the relative superiority
of different algorithms is the same. Their error decreases when s increases, as is
consistent with the experiment results in [Ghinita et al. 2007; Wong et al. 2007;
Xiao and Tao 2007].
In summary, Hybrid and Mondrian produce generalizations with similar data
utility, and both significantly outperform Tailor, Ace, and Mask. Therefore, overall
Hybrid is the best anonymization technique, since it promises much stronger privacy
guarantee than Mondrian.
4.3 Computation Overhead
Having examined the effectiveness of the proposed solutions, we proceed to evaluate
their efficiency. In order to inspect their scalability with the dataset cardinality,
based on OCC (SAL), we generate microdata tables with various cardinalities.
Specifically, given a multiple n of 600k, a table with n tuples is synthesized by
including n/600k copies of OCC (SAL). Figure 14 shows the generalization time of
each method, as a function of n. The running time of Mask exhibits a superlinear
increase with n, while the other algorithms scale almost linearly. Hybrid requires
slightly higher overhead than Mondrian. This is not a serious disadvantage because
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Fig. 15. Computation Time vs. l
(i) the difference is not large, (ii) the disadvantage is the compensated by the trans-
parency of Hybrid, and (iii) anonymization is an offline process, so it is reasonable
to spend a little more time preparing a publication that safeguards privacy better.
Utilizing the 600k datasets, in Figure 15, we inspect the computation overhead
as a function of l. The running time of Ace, Mondrian, and Mask is insensitive
to l. In contrast, the processing cost of Tailor and Hybrid decreases rapidly as l
grows. Recall that, Tailor works by iteratively dividing QI-groups, until all QI-
groups violate 2l-diversity. As l increases, fewer 2l-diverse QI-groups exist; hence
Tailor terminates earlier. Hybrid has similar behavior because it deploys Tailor as
the first step.
In summary, Hybrid is ideal for practical applications because its computation
cost enjoys linear scalability to the dataset cardinality. In particular, it anonymizes
a dataset with nearly 10 million tuples within 5 minutes (see Figure 14).
5. RELATED WORK
The works closest to ours are due to Wong et al. [2007] and Zhang et al. [2007].
Since they has been discussed extensively in Sections 1 and 2.3, the following review
concentrates on the rest of the literature on privacy preserving data publishing.
A bulk of the literature focuses on designing privacy principles. The earliest prin-
ciple, k-anonymity [Samarati 2001], requires that every QI-group should contain at
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least k tuples. Machanavajjhala et al. [2007] point out that a k-anonymous table
may still incur privacy breach, unless each QI-group includes sufficiently diverse
sensitive values. This observation leads to the concept of l-diversity, which has sev-
eral instantiations, e.g., entropy l-diversity, recursive (c, l)-diversity, as discussed in
Section 2.1. Besides k-anonymity and l-diversity, numerous other privacy principles
[Byun et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2007; Kifer and Gehrke 2006; LeFevre et al. 2006b; Li
et al. 2007; Martin et al. 2007; Nergiz et al. 2007; Wang and Fung 2006; Wong et al.
2006; Xiao and Tao 2006b; 2007; Wong et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2007; Zhang et al.
2007] have been developed to offer different flavors of privacy protection, by plac-
ing various constraints on the contents of QI-groups. Our transparent l-diversity
principle distinguishes itself from all the previous principles, in that it guarantees
privacy even when the anonymization process is public knowledge.
Generalization algorithms is another well-explored topic [Aggarwal et al. 2006;
Bayardo and Agrawal 2005; Fung et al. 2005; Ghinita et al. 2007; LeFevre et al.
2005; 2006a; 2006b; Iyengar 2002; Wang et al. 2004; Wong et al. 2006; Xiao and
Tao 2007; Xu et al. 2006; Wong et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2007]. These solutions
aim at minimizing the information loss, according to different anonymization con-
straints (e.g., global/local recoding) and measurements of loss (e.g., discernibility).
Many of them are initially devised for k-anonymity, but can be modified to sup-
port l-diversity and other principles, as explained in [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007].
However, except the algorithms proposed in [Xiao and Tao 2007; Zhang et al. 2007],
none of these algorithms is transparent. In other words, they can no longer ensure
the privacy guarantee of the underlying principle, when an adversary is aware of
the details of the algorithm.
Other problems related to generalization have also attracted considerable re-
search efforts. Specifically, optimal k-anonymous generalization has been shown
to be NP-hard in [Aggarwal et al. 2005; Meyerson and Williams 2004; Park and
Shim 2007], which also develop approximation algorithms with provable worst-case
quality guarantees. Aggarwal [2005] shows that when the number of QI attributes
is large, it is simply impossible to achieve k-anonymity without substantial infor-
mation loss (even when k is small). Xiao and Tao [2006a] develop anatomy as an
alternative anonymization technique that achieves higher data utility than gener-
alization does.
In addition, there exist several anonymization techniques [Agrawal et al. 2005;
Dwork et al. 2006; Evfimievski et al. 2003; Machanavajjhala et al. 2008; Tao et al.
2008] that do not adopt generalization. Instead, they anonymize microdata by
adding random “noise” into the data, i.e., by replacing a fraction of tuples in the
microdata with randomly generated tuples [Agrawal et al. 2005; Evfimievski et al.
2003; Tao et al. 2008], or by deriving the tuple distribution in the microdata and
then publishing a noisy version of the distribution [Dwork et al. 2006; Machanava-
jjhala et al. 2008]. These techniques are designed by assuming that the process for
generating random “noise” is known to the public, and hence, they do not suffer
from reverse engineering attacks.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Most existing anonymization techniques fail to protect privacy against adversaries
with full knowledge of the anonymization mechanism. In this paper, we remedy the
problem with two important contributions. First, we provide a thorough analysis
on the disclosure risks in the anonymized tables, assuming that the anonymization
algorithm is public knowledge. This analysis leads to the formulation of transpar-
ent l-diversity, which ensures small disclosure risks in an anonymized table, even
if everything involved in the anonymization process, except the microdata, is re-
vealed to the public. Second, we identify three anonymized algorithms that can
enforce transparent l-diversity, and demonstrate their practical usefulness through
extensive experiments.
This work also lays down a solid foundation for future research. First, our anal-
ysis focuses on l-diversity due to its popularity in the literature. However, the
concept of transparent anonymization is general, and can be integrated with any
other principle (e.g., t-closeness [Li et al. 2007], δ-presence [Nergiz et al. 2007]).
It is an interesting direction to design transparent generalization algorithms for
those principles. Second, the proposed solutions are heuristic in nature, and do not
have attractive asymptotical performance guarantees. It is a challenging problem to
study theoretical transparent algorithms. Note that the existing findings (including
the complexity results, approximation algorithms, etc.) were derived for conven-
tional generalization, and hence, are not immediately applicable to transparent
anonymization.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Observe that, the adversary’s knowledge about the
external source E can be expressed as T ∈ S, since S consists of all microdata
tables that involve the individuals in E. Furthermore, if T ∈ So,v, then o has a
sensitive value v in T , and vice versa. Hence,
risk(o) = max
v∈As
Pr
{
o has v in T | E ∧ G ∧ T ∗ ∧ l}
= max
v∈As
Pr
{
T ∈ So,v | T ∈ S ∧ G ∧ T
∗ ∧ l}
= max
v∈As
Pr
{
T ∈ So,v | T ∈ S ∧ G(T, l) = T
∗}
= max
v∈As
Pr
{
T ∈ So,v ∧ T ∈ S ∧ G(T, l) = T ∗}
Pr
{
T ∈ S ∧ G(T, l) = T ∗}
= max
v∈As
Pr
{
T ∈ So,v ∧ G(T, l) = T ∗}
Pr
{
T ∈ S ∧ G(T, l) = T ∗}
(since So,v ⊆ S)
= max
v∈As
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
(
Pr
{
T = Tˆ
}
· Pr
{
G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗
})
∑
Tˆ∈S
(
Pr
{
T = Tˆ
}
· Pr
{
G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗
}) .
Recall that, each possible microdata instance in S is equally likely for the adversary,
before s/he observes T ∗. That is, for any Tˆ1, Tˆ2 ∈ S, we have Pr
{
T = Tˆ1
}
=
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Pr
{
T = Tˆ2
}
. Thus,
risk(o) = max
v∈As
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
(
Pr
{
T = Tˆ
}
· Pr
{
G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗
})
∑
Tˆ∈S
(
Pr
{
T = Tˆ
}
· Pr
{
G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗
})
= max
v∈As
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T
∗}
,
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume by contradiction that Opt-Gen is not a minimal
algorithm. Then, there exists a microdata table T and a positive integer l, such
that T ∗1 = Opt-Gen(T, l) is not a minimal l-diverse generalization of T , with respect
to the MBR function f and the global recoding scheme. Let P1 be the partition of
T that decides T ∗1 . By Definition 7, there should be a child P2 of P1, such that P2
and f decide a generalization T ∗2 that conforms to the global recoding scheme.
According to Definition 6, (i) there exists a unique QI-group G1 in P that does
not appear in P2, and (ii) P2 contains only two QI-groups G2 and G3 that are
not included in P1. Furthermore, since G1 = G2 ∪ G3 and G2 ∩ G3 = ∅, we have
|G1| = |G2|+ |G3|. Thus,
∑
G∈P1
|G|2 = |G1|
2 +
∑
G∈P1−{G1}
|G|2
≥ |G2|
2 + |G3|
2 +
∑
G∈P1−{G1}
|G|2
=
∑
G∈P1−{G1}+{G2,G3}
|G|2
=
∑
G∈P2
|G|2,
which contradicts the fact that Opt-Gen minimizes the discernability of the gener-
alized tables. Hence, the lemma is proved. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let G′3 (G
′
4) be the set of tuples in G
′, such that G′3 and G1
(G′4 and G2) involve the same set of individuals. To prove the lemma, it suffices to
show that {G′3, G
′
4} is the canonical l-cut of G
′.
Without loss of generality, assume that {G1, G2} is an l-cut ofG on A
q
i (i ∈ [1, d]).
We will first prove that {G′3, G
′
4} is an l-cut of G
′ on Aqi , i.e., {G
′
3, G
′
4} satisfies the
three conditions in Definition 9. Observe that the first condition trivially holds.
Let v be the most frequent As value in G, and c be the number of tuples in G with
a sensitive value v. Since G and G′ are isomorphic, they contain the same multi-set
of As values. Therefore, c is also the maximum number of tuples in G′ with an
identical sensitive value. Since |G′3| = |G1| ≥ c · l and |G
′
4| = |G2| ≥ c · l, {G
′
3, G
′
4}
fulfills the second condition in Definition 9.
Assume by contradiction that, {G′3, G
′
4} violates the third condition in Defini-
tion 9. There should exist t′3 ∈ G
′
3 and t
′
4 ∈ G
′
4, such that (i) t
′
3[A
q
i ] > t
′
4[A
q
i ], or
(ii) t′3[A
q
i ] = t
′
4[A
q
i ] and t
′
3[A
id] = t′4[A
id]. Let t1 (t2) be the tuple in G1 (G2), such
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that t1 and t3 (t2 and t4) concern the same individual. Then, t1 and t
′
3 (t2 and t
′
4)
should have the same QI values. As a result, we have either (i) t1[A
q
i ] > t2[A
q
i ],
or (ii) t1[A
q
i ] = t2[A
q
i ] and t1[A
id] > t2[A
id]. This contradicts the assumption that
{G1, G2} is an l-cut of G. Therefore, {G′3, G
′
4} is an l-cut of G
′ on Aqi .
Next, we will show that {G′3, G
′
4} is canonical. Assume that this is not true.
Then, by Definition 10, at least one of the following three conditions must hold:
(1) Among the l-cuts of G′, the perimeter of {G′3, G
′
4} is not the smallest.
(2) There exists an l-cut {G′5, G
′
6} of G
′ on Aqj (j < i), such that hp(G
′
5)+hp(G
′
6) =
hp(G
′
3) + hp(G
′
4).
(3) There exists an l-cut {G′5, G
′
6} of G
′ on Aqi , such that |G
′
5| < |G
′
3|, and hp(G
′
5)+
hp(G
′
6) = hp(G
′
3) + hp(G
′
4).
Consider that Condition 3 is satisfied. Let G5 (G6) be the set of tuples in G, such
that G5 and G
′
5 (G6 and G
′
6) contain the same set of individuals. It can be verified
that {G5, G6} is an l-cut of G on A
q
i , and hp(G5) + hp(G6) = hp(G
′
5) + hp(G
′
6).
Then,
hp(G5) + hp(G6) = hp(G
′
5) + hp(G
′
6) = hp(G
′
3) + hp(G
′
4) = hp(G1) + hp(G2).
Furthermore, |G5| = |G′5| < |G
′
3| = |G1|. This contradicts the assumption that
{G1, G2} is the canonical l-cut of G.
Similarly, it can be shown that when Condition 1 or 2 holds, {G1, G2} cannot be
the canonical l-cut of G, leading to a contradiction. Thus, {G′3, G
′
4} should be the
canonical l-cut of G′, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let T ∗2 = Tailor(T2, l), and P3 be the partition of T2 that
decides T ∗2 . We will prove the lemma, by showing that (i) P1 and P3 are isomorphic,
and (ii) P2 = P3. The former guarantees that T
∗
2 = T
∗, since isomorphic partitions
always lead to the same anonymization.
To facilitate our proof, we construct a binary tree R1 of QI-groups as follows.
First, we set the root of R1 to T1. Then, we apply Tailor on T1 with the given l
value, and monitor the execution of Tailor. As shown in Figure 3, Tailor will first
construct a partition P = {G0}, with G0 = T1. Then, each time Tailor computes
the canonical l-cut {G1, G2} of QI-group G ∈ P , we insert G1 and G2 (into R) as
the child nodes of G. As such, after Tailor terminates, each leaf of R1 is a QI-group
in P1, and vice versa. We refer to R1 as the split history of T1. Following the same
methodology, we also construct the split history R2 of T2, such that the leaves of
R2 constitute P3.
Next, we will prove that P1 is isomorphic to P3, by showing that each leaf of R1
is isomorphic to a leaf of R2, and vice versa. Our proof is by induction. For the
base case, let us consider the roots of R1 and R2. Let G1 (G2) denote the root of R1
(R2). We have G1 = T1 and G2 = T2. Since P1 and P2 are isomorphic, T1 and T2
should also be isomorphic, because T1 =
⋃
G∈P1
G and T1 =
⋃
G∈P2
G. Therefore,
G1 is isomorphic to G2.
As a second step, assume that two nodes G3 ∈ R1 and G4 ∈ R2 are isomorphic.
We will establish two propositions:
—Proposition 1. G3 is a leaf of R1, if and only if G4 is a leaf of R2.
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—Proposition 2. If G3 is not a leaf, then each child of G3 is isomorphic to a child
of G4.
Observe that, G3 (G4) is a leaf of R1 (R2), if and only if it is not 2l-diverse,
otherwise it would have been divided into smaller parts by Tailor. Since G3 and G4
are isomorphic, if G3 is not 2l-diverse, G4 must violate 2l-diversity, and vice versa.
Therefore, Proposition 1 holds.
Now assume that G3 is not a leaf. Let {Ga, Gb} and {G′a, G
′
b} be the canonical
l-cuts of G3 and G4, respectively. By Lemma 2, Ga and G
′
a (Gb and G
′
b) contain
the same set of individuals. We will show that Ga (Gb) is isomorphic to G
′
a (G
′
b).
Consider the set Sa of leaves under the subtree of Ga. We have
⋃
G∈Sa
G = Ga.
Since P1 and P2 are isomorphic, there exists a subset S
′
a of P2, such that each
G ∈ Sa is isomorphic to some G′ ∈ S′a, and vice versa. Let G5 =
⋃
G′∈S′a
G′. Then,
G5 is isomorphic to Ga, which indicates that G5 and Ga involve the same set of
individuals. Recall that Ga and G
′
a also contain an identical set of individuals.
Hence, each individual in G′a appears in G5, and vice versa. Because both G
′
a and
G5 are subsets of T2, we have G
′
a = G5. Consequently, G
′
a is isomorphic to Ga.
Similarly, it can be verified that the Gb and G
′
b are isomorphic. Thus, Proposition
2 is valid. By induction, each leave of R1 is isomorphic to a leaf of R2, and vice
versa. Hence, P1 is isomorphic to P3.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that P2 = P3. Since both P2 and P3
are isomorphic to P1, P2 must be isomorphic to P3. Therefore, for each QI-group
G ∈ P2, there exists G
′ ∈ P3, such that G andG
′ involve the same set of individuals.
This indicates that G = G′, since the both G and G′ are subsets of T2. Therefore,
P2 = P3, which proves the lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let T be any microdata table, l be any positive integer,
and T ∗ = G(T, l). Let E be any external source, and C be the set of possible
microdata instances based on E, such that G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗ for any Tˆ ∈ C. Let o be
any individual, v be an arbitrary sensitive value, and C′ the subset of C, such that
each Tˆ ∈ C′ contains a tuple t with t[Aid] = o and t[As] = v. By Proposition 1, we
can prove Theorem 1 by showing that
|C′|
|C|
≤
1
l
. (5)
For each Tˆ ∈ C, we define the essential partition of Tˆ , as the partition of Tˆ
generated by G, when taking Tˆ and l as input. We divide C into disjoint clusters,
such that each cluster is a maximal set of instances (in C) whose essential partitions
are isomorphic. Let n be the total number of clusters in C, and Cj (j ∈ [1, n]) the
j-th cluster. Let C′j be a set containing the instances in Cj that associate o with
v. In the following, we will show that |C′j |/|Cj | ≤ 1/l for any j ∈ [1, n], which will
prove the theorem, as it leads to
|C′|
|C|
=
∑n
j=1 |C
′
j |∑n
j=1 |Cj |
≤
∑n
j=1 |Cj |/l∑n
j=1 |Cj |
=
1
l
. (6)
Consider any Tˆ ∈ Cj for some j ∈ [1, n]. Let Pˆ be the essential partition of Tˆ ,
m = |Pˆ |, and Gk (k ∈ [1,m]) the k-th QI-group in Pˆ . Let Pˆ ′ be a partition isomor-
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phic to Pˆ , and Tˆ ′ =
⋃
G′∈Pˆ ′ . Since Tˆ
′ and Tˆ involve the same set of individuals,
Tˆ ′ is a possible microdata instance based on E. By the assumption on G, we have
G(Tˆ ′, l) = T ∗. Therefore, Tˆ ′ ∈ Cj . In other words, for any partition Pˆ ′ isomorphic
to Pˆ , the microdata corresponding to Pˆ ′ is contained in Cj . Then, by the definition
of Cj , |Cj | should equal the total number of distinct partitions isomorphic to Pˆ ,
including Pˆ itself. According to the definition of partition isomorphism, we can
obtain any partition isomorphic to Pˆ , by replacing any QI-groups in Pˆ with their
isomorphic counterparts. Let ak be the number of distinct QI-groups isomorphic
to Gk. Then, the total number of partitions isomorphic to Pˆ should be
∏m
k=1 ak.
That is, |Cj | =
∏m
k=1 ak.
Next, we will derive the value of |C′j |. Without loss of generality, assume that o
appears in the first QI-group G1 of Pi. Among the QI-groups isomorphic to G1, let
a′1 be the number of QI-groups that associate o with a sensitive value v. Then, we
have |C′j | = a
′
1 ·
∏m
k=2 ak. Therefore, |C
′
j |/|Cj | = a
′
1/a1.
If v does not appear in G1, then a
′
1 = 0. Otherwise, assume that G1 contains x
sensitive values v1, v2, ..., vx, such that v1 = v. Further assume that, there exist bi
(i ∈ [1, x]) tuples in G1 with a sensitive value vi. Then, there are
|G1|!∑
x
i=1
(bi!)
different
combinations between the sensitive values and the individuals in G1. Since each
combination corresponds to a QI-group isomorphic to G1, we have
a1 =
|G1|!∑x
i=1(bi!)
. (7)
Observe that, among the a1 combinations, there exist
(|G1|−1)!∑
x
i=2
(bi!)
combinations that
assigns a sensitive value v1 to o. Therefore,
a′1 =
(|G1| − 1)!∑x
i=2(bi!)
. (8)
Hence, we have
|C′j |
|Cj |
=
a′1
a1
=
(|G1| − 1)!/
∑x
i=2(bi!)
(|G1|!)/
∑x
i=1(bi!)
=
b1
|G1|
. (9)
Since G1 is l-diverse, we have b1/|G1| ≤ 1/l. Consequently, |C′j |/|Cj | ≤ 1/l, which
completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Given any two sets St and S
′
t of tuples, we say that they are
cousins, if St and S
′
t involve the same set of individuals. To prove the lemma, we
first establish the following proposition:
—Proposition 3. Let B and B′ be two symmetric buckets, and {Ba, Bb} be a
division of B on Aqi (i ∈ [1, d]). Let B
′
a (B
′
b) be the subset of B
′, such that
Ba and B
′
a (Bb and B
′
b) are cousins. Then, {B
′
a, B
′
b} is a division of B
′ on Aqi .
Furthermore, B′a and Ba (B
′
b and Bb) are symmetric.
Let V be the signature of B, and x = |V |. Since B and B′ are symmetric, V
should also be the signature of B′. Because B′a and B
′
b are subsets of B
′, their
signatures should be subsets of V . In the following, we will first show that B′a is a
bucket with a signature V . Assume that this is not true. Then, there must exist a
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column L′1 of B
′
a, such that |L
′
1| ≥ |B
′
a|/x. Let L1 be the subset of Ba, such that L1
and L′1 are cousins. Because B and B
′ are symmetric, if any two individuals have
the same sensitive value in B′, they should also have an identical As value in B.
This indicates that all tuples in L1 share the same A
s value. Since |L1| ≥ |Ba|/x,
Ba should have a column with more than |Ba|/x tuples. This contradicts the
assumption that Ba is a bucket. Therefore, B
′
a must be a bucket with a signature
V . By the same reasoning, it can be proved that B′b is also a bucket with a signature
V .
Assume by contradiction that, {B′a, B
′
b} is not a division of B
′ on Aqi . Then,
by Definition 11, there must exist two tuples t′a ∈ B
′
a and t
′
b ∈ B
′
b, such that (i)
t′a[A
q
i ] > t
′
b[A
q
i ], or (ii) t
′
a[A
q
i ] = t
′
b[A
q
i ] and t
′
a[A
id] > t′b[A
id]. Let ta and tb be the
tuples in Ba, such that ta and t
′
a (tb and t
′
b) concern the same individual. Then, we
have either (i) ta[A
q
i ] > tb[A
q
i ], or (ii) ta[A
q
i ] = tb[A
q
i ] and ta[A
id] > tb[A
id]. In that
case, {Ba, Bb} is not a division of B, leading to a contradiction. Hence, {B′a, B
′
b}
must be a division of B′.
To prove Proposition 3, it remains to show that B′a and Ba (B
′
b and Bb) are
symmetric. Consider any column L2 ∈ Ba. We have |L2| = |Ba|/x = |B′a|/x.
Let L′2 be the cousin of L2 in B
′
a. Then, |L
′
2| = |L2| = |B
′
a|/x. Since B and B
′
are symmetric, for any individuals with the same sensitive value in B, they should
also share an identical As value in B′. Therefore, all tuples in L′2 have the same
sensitive value. Observe that, each column in B′a should contain exactly |B
′
a|/x
tuples, which indicates that L′2 is a column in B
′
a. In summary, for any column L2
in Ba, there exists a column L
′
2 in B
′
a, such that L2 and L
′
2 involve an identical set
of individuals. Hence, B′a is symmetric to Ba. Similarly, it can be shown that B
′
b
and Bb are symmetric. Thus, Proposition 3 holds.
Now we are ready to prove the lemma. Without loss of generality, assume that
{B1, B2} is a division of B on A
q
i (i ∈ [1, d]). Let B
′
3 (B
′
4) be the subset of B
′, such
that B′3 and B1 (B
′
4 and B2) are cousins. By Proposition 3, {B
′
3, B
′
4} is a division of
B′ on Aqi , and B
′
3 (B
′
4) is symmetric to B1 (B2). To establish the lemma, it suffice
to show that {B′3, B
′
4} is the canonical division of B
′. Assume, on the contrary,
that {B′3, B
′
4} is not canonical. Then, by Definition 12, {B
′
3, B
′
4} should satisfy at
least one of the following three conditions:
(1) {B′3, B
′
4} is not a division of G
′ with the smallest perimeter.
(2) There exists a division {B′5, B
′
6} of G
′ on Aqj (j < i), such that hp(B
′
5) +
hp(B
′
6) = hp(B
′
3) + hp(B
′
4).
(3) There exists a division {B′5, B
′
6} of G
′ on Aqi , such that hp(B
′
5) + hp(B
′
6) =
hp(B
′
3) + hp(B
′
4).
Assume that {B′3, B
′
4} fulfills Condition 3. Let B5 (B6) be subset of B, such that
B5 and B
′
5 (B6 and B
′
6) are cousins. By Proposition 3, {B5, B6} is a division of B
on Aqi . Then, |B5| = |B
′
5| < |B
′
3| = |B1|. Since each individual has the same QI
values in B and B′,
hp(B5) + hp(B6) = hp(B
′
5) + hp(B
′
6) = hp(B
′
3) + hp(B
′
4) = hp(B1) + hp(B2).
In that case, {B1, B2} cannot be the canonical division of B (due to the existence of
{B5, B6}), leading to a contradiction. Therefore, {B′3, B
′
4} must violate Condition
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3. Similarly, it can be verified that {B′3, B
′
4} must also violate Conditions 1 and 2,
i.e., {B′3, B
′
4} should be the canonical division of B
′. Thus, the lemma is proved.

Proof of Lemma 5. Consider that we apply Slice on U1, with the given l value.
As shown in Figure 8, Slice will iteratively retrieve a bucket B ∈ U1, compute the
canonical division {Ba, Bb} of B, and then replace B with Ba and Bb. This process
is carried on, until the bucket partition U ′1 is obtained. Let Q1 be the union of the
canonical divisions computed by Slice in each iteration, and Q′1 = Q1 ∪ U1. We
organize the buckets in Q′1 into |U1| binary trees as follows:
(1) For the i-th (i ∈ [1, |U1|]) binary tree Ri, the root of Ri is the i-th bucket Bi
in U1.
(2) For any three buckets B1, B2, B3 ∈ Q′, B2 and B3 are the child nodes of B1, if
and only if {B2, B3} is a division of B1.
We refer to Ri as the split history of Bi. Notice that, U
′
1 equals the union of the
leaves of each Ri (i ∈ [1, |U1|]). Next, assume that we apply Slice on U2. Let B′i
denote the bucket in U2 that is symmetric to Bi (i ∈ [1, |U1|]). Following the way
Ri is generated, we also construct the split history R
′
i of B
′
i. Then, the leaves of
all R′i (i ∈ [1, |U1|]) constitute U
′
2. To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that, for
any i ∈ [1, |U1|], each leaf of Ri is symmetric to a leaf of R
′
i, and vice versa.
Our proof is by induction. For the base case, the root Bi of Ri is symmetric to
the root B′i of R
′
i. Next, assume that two nodes B ∈ Ri and B
′ ∈ R′i are symmetric.
We will show that (i) B is a leaf of Ri, if and only if B
′ is a leaf of R′i; (ii) if B is
not a leaf, then each child node of B is symmetric to a child node of B′.
As shown in Figure 8, a bucket in Ri or R
′
i is a leaf, if and only if it is not divisible,
otherwise it would have been split into two smaller buckets by Slice. Because B
and B′ are symmetric, all columns in B and B′ have an equal size. Thus, B is not
divisible, if and only if B′ is not divisible. Hence, B is a leaf, if and only if B′ is a
leaf.
Next, consider that B is not a leaf. Let {Ba, Bb} and {B′a, B
′
b} be the canonical
divisions of B and B′, respectively. By Lemma 4, Ba and B
′
a (Bb and B
′
b) must be
symmetric. Therefore, each child node of B is symmetric to a child node of B′. By
induction, it can be shown that each leaf of Ri is symmetric to a leaf of R
′
i, and
vice versa. Hence, the lemma is proved. 
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider that we apply Assign on T1 with the given l value.
As shown in Figure 6, Assign first initializes a set St = T1, and then iteratively
creates buckets using tuples in St. Let U be the partition returned by Assign at
the end, Bi the bucket constructed in the i-th iteration, and Si the set of tuples
in St right before the i-th iteration. Next, assume that we run Assign on T2. Let
U ′ be the partition of T2 generated by Assign, B
′
i the bucket created in the i-th
iteration, and S′i the set of tuples in St prior to the i-th iteration. For simplicity,
we say that two buckets are siblings, if and only if they have the same size and the
same signature. In the following, we will first prove a proposition:
—Proposition 4. for any i ∈ [1, |U |], Bi and B′i are siblings.
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Consider that i = 1. By Lines 4-12 in Figure 6, the signature of B1 should
contain the β most frequent sensitive values in St, and |B1| = α · β, where the
values of α and β are decided by |S1| and the frequencies of sensitive values in S1.
The above statement still holds, if we change B1 to B
′
1, and S1 to S
′
1. Recall that
S1 = T1 =
⋃
B∈U1
B and S′1 = T2 =
⋃
B′∈U2
B′. Since U1 and U2 are symmetric,
S1 and S
′
1 should have the same size, and include an identical multi-set of sensitive
values. Therefore, Assign should employ the same α and β values to construct B1
and B′1. Thus, B1 and B
′
1 are siblings. Furthermore, because S2 = S1 − B1 and
S′2 = S
′
1−B
′
1, S2 and S
′
2 should have an equal size, and contain the same multi-set
of sensitive values. In turn, this indicates that, Assign should use identical α and
β values to generate B2 and B
′
2, i.e., B2 and B
′
2 are also siblings. By an induction
on i, it can be shown that Proposition 4 holds.
To prove the lemma, we regard U and U ′ as random variables, and show that
Pr
{
U = U1
}
= Pr
{
U ′ = U2
}
. Let us derive Pr
{
U = U1
}
first. Recall that each
bucket in U is constructed using tuples randomly selected from T1. Therefore,
Pr
{
U = U1
}
should equal 1/m, where m is the total number of possible ways to
assign the tuples in T1 into the buckets in U . Assume that T1 contains w sensitive
values v1, v2, ..., vw. Let nj (j ∈ [1, w]) be the frequency of vj in in T1. Let dij
denote the number of tuples in Bi with sensitive value vj . For simplicity, define
0! = 1. We have
m =
∏w
j=1(nj !)∏|U|
i=1
∏w
j=1(dij !)
. (10)
Next, we will calculate Pr
{
U ′=U2
}
. Since T1 and T2 contain the same multi-
set of sensitive values, for any j ∈ [1, w], the frequency of vj in T2 is also nj .
Furthermore, because Bi and B
′
i (i ∈ [1, |U |]) are siblings, there should exist dij
tuples in B′i that have a sensitive value vj . As a result, there are also m distinct
ways to assign the tuples in T2 to the buckets in U
′. Therefore, Pr
{
U ′ = U2
}
=
1/m = Pr
{
U=U1
}
, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let T be any microdata, l be any positive integer, and
T ∗ be a possible output of G. Let E be any external source, and S be the set of
possible microdata instances based on E. Let o be any individual, v be an arbitrary
sensitive value, and So,v be the subset of S, such that each Tˆ ∈ So,v associates o
with v. According to Proposition 1, we can prove Theorem 2 by showing that
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T
∗}
≤
1
l
. (11)
We say that a bucket partition U is a valid partition, if T ∗ can be decided by the
partition U ′ = GB(U). Let M be the set of all valid partitions, such that for each
U ∈M , we have Pr{GA(Tˆ , l) = U} > 0 for some Tˆ ∈ S. Then,
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T
∗}
=
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
∑
U∈M Pr{GA(Tˆ , l) = U}∑
Tˆ∈S
∑
U∈M Pr{GA(Tˆ , l) = U}
. (12)
We define a bucket partition U ∈ M as a breaching partition, if any QI-group
G ∈ U contains a tuple t, such that t[Aid] = o and t[As] = v. Observe that,
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for any Tˆ ∈ So,v, if U is not a breaching partition, then Pr{GA(Tˆ , l) = U} = 0.
We divide M into disjoint clusters, such that each cluster is a maximal subset of
symmetric bucket partitions in M . Let n be the total number of clusters in M ,
and Mj (j ∈ [1, n]) be the j-th cluster. Let M ′j be the set of breaching partitions
in Mj. We have
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T
∗}
=
∑n
j=1
∑
U∈M ′
j
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{GA(Tˆ , l) = U}
∑n
j=1
∑
U∈Mj
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{GA(Tˆ , l) = U}
. (13)
For simplicity, let p(U, Tˆ ) denote Pr{GA(Tˆ , l) = U}, and q(M,S) denote∑
U∈M
∑
Tˆ∈S p(U, Tˆ ). We will show that q(M
′
j , So,v)/q(Mj, S) ≤ 1/l for any
j ∈ [1, n]. This will lead to
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T ∗}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{G(Tˆ , l) = T
∗}
=
∑n
j=1 q(M
′
j , So,v)∑n
j=1 q(Mj , S)
≤
∑n
j=1 q(Mj , S)/l∑n
j=1 q(Mj , S)
=
1
l
, (14)
which proves the theorem.
Without loss of generality, consider that j = 1. Let Uk be the k-th (k ∈ [1, |M1|])
partition in M1, and Tk =
⋃
B∈Uk
B. For any microdata Tˆ different from Tk, we
have p(Uk, Tˆ ) = 0, since Uk is not a partition of Tˆ . Therefore, Tk ∈ S should
hold, otherwise p(Uk, Tˆ ) = 0 for all Tˆ ∈ S, which contradicts the assumption that
Uk ∈ M . Thus,
∑
Tˆ∈S p(Uk, Tˆ ) = p(Uk, Tk). By our assumption on GA, for any
k1, k2 ∈ [1, |M1|], we have p(Uk1 , Tk1) = p(Uk2 , Tk2). Hence,
q(M1, S) =
|M1|∑
j=1
∑
Tˆ∈S
p(Uj, Tˆ ) =
|M1|∑
j=1
p(Uj , Tj) = |M1| · p(Uk, Tk).
Similarly, it can be verified that q(M ′1, So,v) = |M
′
1| · p(Uk, Tk). Therefore,
q(M ′j , So,v)/q(Mj, S) = |M
′
1|/|M1|.
Next, we will derive the value of |M1|. Let Us be any partition symmetric to Uk,
and Ts =
⋃
B∈Us
B. Then, Ts and Tk should contain the same set of individuals.
Hence, Ts ∈ S. Since Us and Uk are symmetric, p(Us, Ts) = p(Uk, Tk) > 0 holds.
Therefore, Us is a valid partition. Let U
′
s = GB(Us), and U
′
k = GB(Uk). By our
assumption on GB, U ′s and U
′
k are symmetric. Observe that symmetric partitions are
isomorphic, and thus, they always lead to the same anonymization. Since U ′k and
f decides T ∗, U ′s and f should also determine T
∗, which indicates that Us ∈M . In
other words, any bucket symmetric to Uk should be contained inM . Consequently,
by the definition of M1, |M1| equals the total number of partitions symmetric to
Uk.
By Definition 13, we can obtain any partition symmetric to Uk, by substituting
any buckets in Uk with their symmetric counterparts. Let Bi be the i-th (i ∈
[1, |Uk|]) bucket in Uk, and αi be the number of buckets symmetric to Bi. Then,
|M1| =
∏|Uk|
i=1 αi. Without loss of generality, assume that o appears in B1. Among
all buckets symmetric to B1, let α
′
1 be the number of them that contain a tuple
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t, with t[Aid] = o and t[As] = v. We have |M1| = α′1 ·
∏|Uk|
i=2 αi. Therefore,
|M ′1|/|M1| = α
′
1/α1.
Assume B1 has a signature V with x sensitive values. If v /∈ V , then α′1 = 0.
Consider that v ∈ V . Recall that, we can transform B1 into any bucket symmetric
to B1, by swapping the sensitive values between different columns of B1. Totally,
there are x! distinct ways to assign x sensitive values to the x columns of B1.
Because each of these assignment corresponds to bucket symmetric to B1, we have
α1 = x!. Next, consider that we assign an A
s value v to the column that o appears.
The other x − 1 sensitive values can be assigned in (x − 1)! different manner, i.e.,
α′1 = (x − 1)!. Hence, α
′
1/α1 = 1/x. According to the way Assign constructs each
bucket, we have x ≥ l. Therefore, |M ′1|/|M1| = α
′
1/α1 ≤ 1/l, which completes the
proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let S the set of possible microdata instances based on E,
and v be an arbitrary sensitive value. Let So,v be the subset of S, such that each
Tˆ ∈ So,v involves o, and sets v as the As value of o. By Proposition 1, Theorem 3
holds if and only if
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{Hybrid(Tˆ , l) = T ∗}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{Hybrid(Tˆ , l) = T
∗}
≤
1
l
. (15)
Consider that we apply Hybrid on any Tˆ ∈ S, with the given l value. Hybrid
first employs Tailor to obtain a partition P of Tˆ . We define P as the essential
partition of Tˆ , and use Gj to denote the j-th (j ∈ [1, |P |]) QI-group in P . Then,
Hybrid invokes Ace to transform each Gj ∈ P into a set T
∗
j of anonymized tuples.
We define the ordered set {T ∗1 , T
∗
2 , ..., T
∗
|P |} as a decomposition of P . Since Ace is
a randomized algorithm, there may exist multiple decompositions of P . At last,
Hybrid returns the union T ∗ of all T ∗j . We use γ(P, T
∗) to denote the probability
that Hybrid transforms P into T ∗.
Let Q (Q′) be a set that includes the essential partition of any Tˆ ∈ S (Tˆ ∈
So,v). We divide Q into several clusters, such that each cluster is a maximal set
of isomorphic partitions in Q. Let n be the total number of clusters in Q, and Ck
(k ∈ [1, n]) be the k-th cluster. Let C′k = Ck ∩Q
′. Then, we have
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{Hybrid(Tˆ , l) = T ∗}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{Hybrid(Tˆ , l) = T
∗}
=
∑n
j=1
∑
P∈C′
k
γ(P, T ∗)∑n
k=1
∑
P∈Ck
γ(P, T ∗)
. (16)
We will prove that, for any k ∈ [1, n],
∑
P∈C′
k
γ(P, T ∗)∑
P∈Ck
γ(P, T ∗)
≤
1
l
. (17)
This will establish the Theorem, since it ensures that
∑
Tˆ∈So,v
Pr{Hybrid(Tˆ , l) = T ∗}
∑
Tˆ∈S Pr{Hybrid(Tˆ , l) = T
∗}
=
∑n
j=1
∑
P∈C′
k
γ(P, T ∗)∑n
k=1
∑
P∈Ck
γ(P, T ∗)
≤
∑n
j=1
∑
P∈Ck
γ(P, T ∗)/l∑n
k=1
∑
P∈Ck
γ(P, T ∗)
=
1
l
.
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Without loss of generality, consider that k = 1. Let P be an arbitrary partition
in C1, and Gj the j-th QI-group in P . Assume that o is involved in G1. Further
assume that, for any P ′ ∈ C1, the j-th (j ∈ [1, |P |]) QI-group in P ′ is isomorphic
to Gj . Then, for any P
′ ∈ C1, o should appear in the first QI-group of P ′. We
split C1 into sub-clusters, such that for any two partitions in the same sub-cluster,
they coincide on all but the first QI-group. Let n′ be the number of sub-clusters
in C1, Di (i ∈ [1, n′]) be the i-th sub-cluster, and D′i = Di ∩ Q
′. To prove that
Equation 17 holds for k = 1, it suffices to show that, for any i ∈ [1, n′],
∑
P∈D′
i
γ(P, T ∗)∑
P∈Di
γ(P, T ∗)
≤
1
l
. (18)
This is because, once the above inequality is established, we have
∑
P∈C′
1
γ(P, T ∗)∑
P∈C1
γ(P, T ∗)
=
∑n′
i=1
∑
P∈D′
i
γ(P, T ∗)
∑n′
i=1
∑
P∈Di
γ(P, T ∗)
≤
∑n′
i=1
∑
P∈Di
γ(P, T ∗)/l
∑n′
i=1
∑
P∈Di
γ(P, T ∗)
=
1
l
. (19)
Assume, without loss of generality, that i = 1. Let Px (x ∈ [1, |D1|]) be x-th
partition in D1, and Gxm be the m-th (m ∈ [1, |Px|]) QI-group in Px. Let Sd be
a set containing any decomposition of any Px ∈ D1, and Ω be the subset of Sd,
such that each decomposition W ∈ Ω leads to T ∗, i.e.,
⋃
T∗s ∈W
T ∗s = T
∗. Let Wj
be the j-th decomposition in Ω, and T ∗jm the m-th set of anonymized tuples in Wj .
Observe that |Wj | = |Px| for any j ∈ [1, |Ω|] and any x ∈ [1, |D1|]. By the definition
of γ(Px, T
∗), we have
γ(Px, T
∗) =
|Ω|∑
j=1
|Px|∏
m=1
Pr
{
Ace(Gxm, l) = T
∗
jm
}
(20)
For simplicity, we denote
∏|Px|
m=1 Pr
{
Ace(Gxm, l) = T
∗
jm
}
as p(Px,Wj). Then,
∑
P∈D′
1
γ(P, T ∗)∑
P∈D1
γ(P, T ∗)
=
∑
Px∈D′1
∑|Ω|
j=1 p(Px,Wj)∑
Px∈D1
∑|Ω|
j=1 p(Px,Wj)
. (21)
To prove that Equation 18 is valid when i = 1, we will show that∑
Px∈D′1
p(Px,Wj)∑
Px∈D1
p(Px,Wj)
≤
1
l
, (22)
for any j ∈ [1, |Ω|]. In particular, the above inequality ensures that
∑
P∈D′
1
γ(P, T ∗)∑
P∈Di
γ(P, T ∗)
=
∑
Px∈D′1
∑|Ω|
j=1p(Px,Wj)∑
Px∈D1
∑|Ω|
j=1p(Px,Wj)
(by Equation 21)
≤
∑|Ω|
j=1
∑
Px∈D1
p(Px,Wj)/l∑|Ω|
j=1
∑
Px∈D1
p(Px,Wj)
=
1
l
(23)
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Let q(Gxm, T
∗
jm) denote Pr
{
Ace(Gxm, l) = T
∗
jm
}
. Recall that any two partitions
in D1 coincide on all but the first QI-group. Therefore, given any m ∈ [2, |Px|] and
any j ∈ [1, |Ω|], the value of q(Gxm, T ∗jm) is fixed for all Px ∈ D1. Let rj denote∏|Px|
k=2 q(Gxm, T
∗
jm). Then,
p(Px,Wj) =
|Px|∏
m=1
Pr
{
Ace(Gxm, l) = T
∗
jm
}
=
|Px|∏
m=1
q(Gxm, T
∗
jm)
= rj · q(Gx1, T
∗
j1). (24)
Therefore, for any j ∈ [1, |Ω|],
∑
Px∈D′1
p(Px,Wj)∑
Px∈D1
p(Px,Wj)
=
∑
Px∈D′1
(
rj · q(Gx1, T ∗j1)
)
∑
P∈D1
(
rj · q(Gx1, T ∗j1)
)
=
∑
Px∈D′1
q(Gx1, T
∗
j1)∑
Px∈D1
q(Gx1, T ∗j1)
. (25)
Consequently, to prove Equation 22, it suffices to show that∑
Px∈D′1
q(Gx1, T
∗
j1)∑
Px∈D1
q(Gx1, T ∗j1)
≤
1
l
, (26)
for any j ∈ [1, |Ω|].
Let S1 be a set containing all Gx1 (x ∈ [1, |D1|]), and S′1 the maximal subset of
S1, such that each G ∈ S′1 contains a tuple t with t[A
id] = o and t[As] = v. Then,
∑
Px∈D′1
q(Gx1, T
∗
j1)∑
Px∈D1
q(Gx1, T ∗j1)
=
∑
G∈S′
1
q(G, T ∗j1)∑
G∈S1
q(G, T ∗j1)
. (27)
By the definition of D1, all QI-groups in S1 are isomorphic. Therefore, all QI-
groups in S1 have the same projection on the identifier and QI attributes. Denote
this projection as E. If we regard each QI-group Gx1 ∈ S1 as a tiny microdata
table, then E can be deemed as an external source for Gx1. Let S2 be the set of
all possible instances based on E. Let S′2 be the set of instances in S2 that contain
a tuple t, with t[Aid] = o and t[As] = v. By Theorem 2, given E as the external
source, any T ∗j1 (j ∈ [1, |Ω|]) ensures that the disclosure risk of o is at most 1/l, i.e.,∑
G∈S′
2
q(G, T ∗j1)∑
G∈S2
q(G, T ∗j1)
≤
1
l
. (28)
By Equations 27 and 28, we can establish Equation 26 by showing that∑
G∈S′
1
q(G, T ∗j1)∑
G∈S1
q(G, T ∗j1)
=
∑
G∈S′
2
q(G, T ∗j1)∑
G∈S2
q(G, T ∗j1)
. (29)
For this purpose, it suffices to prove that q(G, T ∗j1) = 0, for any G ∈ (S1 − S2) ∪
(S2 − S1) and any G ∈ (S′1 − S
′
2) ∪ (S
′
2 − S
′
1).
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Since S2 contains all microdata instances based on E, we have Gx1 ∈ S1 for
any x ∈ [1, |D1|]. Therefore, S1 ⊆ S2, which indicates that S′1 ⊆ S
′
2. Hence,
S1 − S2 = S′1 − S
′
2 = ∅. Now consider any Px ∈ D1 (x ∈ [1, |D1|]). Assume that
we construct a partition P ′x from Px, by replacing Gx1 with any of its isomorphic
counterparts. Then, P ′x should be isomorphic to Px. By Lemma 3, P
′
x is an essential
partition of some Tˆ ∈ S, i.e., P ′x ∈ Q. Since P
′
x and Px are isomorphic, and coincide
on all but the first QI-group, P ′x ∈ D1 holds. In other words, for any G isomorphic
to Gx1, there exists a partition Pi ∈ D1 (i ∈ [1, |D1|]), such that G = Gi1. Hence,
S1 contains any QI-group isomorphic to Gx1.
Recall that, any T ∗j1 (j ∈ [1, |Ω|]) is a anonymization of a certain QI-group in S1.
Since all QI-groups in S1 are isomorphic, they contain the same multi-set of sensitive
values. This indicates that any T ∗j1 and any Gx1 (x ∈ [1, |D1|]) have an identical
multi-set of sensitive values. Let G′ be a QI-group, such that G′ ∈ S2−S1. Then, G′
and Gx1 are not isomorphic, but involve the same set of individuals. Therefore, G
′
and Gx1 must contain distinct multi-sets of A
s values. Hence, for any j ∈ [1, |Ω|],
the multi-sets of sensitive values in G′ and T ∗j are different, i.e., G
′ cannot be
anonymized to T ∗j . Therefore, q(G, T
∗
j1) = 0, for any G ∈ S1 − S2. Similarly, it
can be shown that q(G, T ∗j1) = 0, for any G ∈ S
′
2 − S
′
1. Thus, Equation 29 is valid.
In turn, this establishes Equations 29, 26, 22, 18, and 17. Hence, the theorem is
proved. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX
The electronic appendix for this article can be accessed in the ACM Digital Li-
brary by visiting the following URL: http://www.acm.org/pubs/citations/
journals/tods/20YY-V-N/p1-.
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In this electronic appendix, we exemplify an attack against the Mask algorithm
[Wong et al. 2007], which is designed under the credibility model [Wong et al.
2007]. Figure 1 illustrates the pseudo-code of Mask. The algorithm takes as input
a microdata table T , two positive integers k and l, and a subset V of the As values.
It aims to ensure that, for any individual o and any sensitive value v ∈ V , the
adversary would have at most 1/l posterior belief in the event that “o appears in T
and has a sensitive value v”. We will explain the details of Mask using an example.
Example 1. Suppose that we apply Mask on the microdata T9 in Table I, by
setting k = l = 2 and V = {dyspepsia}. Mask first generates a k-anonymous
partition P of T9, using any of the existing k-anonymity algorithms (Line 1 in
Figure 1). Assume that P contains three QI-groups, namely, {Ann, Bob}, {Cate,
Don}, and {Ed, Fred, Gill}. Next, Mask divides P into two disjoint subsets P1
and P2 (Lines 2-6). In particular, P1 contains all the QI-groups G in P , such that
at least one sensitive value in V appears more than |G|/l times in G. Meanwhile,
P2 = P − P1. In our example, P1 contains only one QI-group G′ = {Ann, Bob}.
After that,Mask randomly chooses a QI-groupG+ from P2, and then modifies the
sensitive values in G′, so that G′ and G+ have the same sensitive value distribution
(Lines 7-9). Assume that G+ = {Cate, Don}. Then, G′ will be modified in a way,
such that 50% of tuples in G′ would have a sensitive value flu, and the other 50%
would have dyspepsia. Table II illustrates a possible result of the modification.
Finally, Mask returns the anonymization decided by the modified partition and an
anonymization function (say, the MBR function), as illustrated in Table III. 
As T ∗10 (in Table III) is produced byMask with l = 2, under the credibility model,
an adversary has at most 1/2 posterior belief in the event that “Ann has dyspepsia
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Algorithm Mask (T , k, l, V )
1. generate a k-anonymous partition P of T
2. P1 = P2 = ∅
3. for each QI-group G ∈ P
4. if one of the sensitive value in V appears more than |G|/l times in G
5. insert G into P1
6. else insert G into P2
7. for each QI-group G′ ∈ P1
8. randomly choose a QI-group G+ ∈ P2
9. modify the sensitive values in G′, such that the distribution of sensitive values in
G′ becomes the same as that in G+
10. return the anonymization decided by P1 ∪ P2 and an anonymization function
Fig. 1. The Mask algorithm
Name Age Disease 
Ann 21 dyspepsia 
Bob 27 dyspepsia 
Cate 32 dyspepsia 
Don 32 flu 
Ed 54 flu 
Fred 60 flu 
Gill 60 flu 
 
Table I. Microdata T9
Name Age Disease 
Ann 21 flu 
Bob 27 dyspepsia 
Cate 32 dyspepsia 
Don 32 flu 
Ed 54 flu 
Fred 60 flu 
Gill 60 flu 
 
Table II. Partition P ′
Age Disease 
[21, 27] flu 
[21, 27] dyspepsia 
32 dyspepsia 
32 flu 
[54, 60] flu 
[54, 60] flu 
[54, 60] flu 
 
Table III. Generalization T ∗10
in the microdata”. In the following, however, we will show that the posterior belief
of the adversary can be boosted to 5/8, if s/he has (i) the details of Mask, (ii) the
parameters k, l, and V with which T ∗10 is computed, and (iii) an external source
that contains only the seven individuals in T9.
Upon observing T ∗10, the adversary knows that T
∗
10 is generated from a partition
P with three QI-groups G1 = {Ann, Bob}, G2 = {Cate, Don}, and G3 = {Ed,
Fred, Gill}. In addition, the adversary can infer that all sensitive values in G3 must
have not been modified by Mask. Otherwise, the distribution of sensitive values in
G3 must be adopted from another QI-group in Table II, which is impossible since
neither G1 nor G2 has the same sensitive value distribution as G3. On the other
hand, the sensitive values in G1 and G2 may or may not have been modified by
Mask. This leads to three different cases:
(1) Both G1 and G2 have been modified. This case is impossible; otherwise, the
distributions of sensitive values in G1 and G2 should have been transformed to
the same as in G3, which is the only QI-group in P that satisfies 2-diversity.
(2) Either G1 or G2 has been modified. In this case, one of G1 and G2 should
contain two dyspepsia before modification (since dyspepsia is the only value in
V ), while the other one should have one flu and one dyspepsia. This results in
4 possible microdata instances, 3 of which assign dyspepsia to Ann.
(3) Neither G1 nor G2 has been modified. This leads to 4 possible microdata in-
stances, 2 of which associate Ann with dyspepsia.
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In summary, from the adversary’s perspective, there exist 8 possible microdata
instances that can be generalized into T ∗10, among which 5 instances associate Ann
with dyspepsia. Therefore, the adversary has 5/8 posterior belief in the event that
“Ann has dyspepsia”.
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
Age Zipcode Group ID  Group ID Disease 
21 10000 1  1 dyspepsia 
27 18000 1  1 flu 
32 35000 2  2 bronchitis 
32 35000 2  2 gastritis 
54 60000 3  3 diabetes  
60 63000 3  3 dyspepsia 
60 63000 3  3 flu 
60 63000 3  3 gastritis 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Age Zipcode Disease 
[21, 27] [10k, 18k] flu 
[21, 27] [10k, 18k] dyspepsia 
[32, 54] [35k, 60k] gastritis 
[32, 54] [35k, 60k] bronchitis 
[32, 54] [35k, 60k] flu 
60 63000 dyspepsia 
60 63000 diabetes 
60 63000 gastritis 
 
Name Age Zipcode Disease 
Ann 21 10000 flu 
Bob 27 18000 dyspepsia 
Cate 32 35000 gastritis 
Don 32 35000 bronchitis 
Ed 54 60000 flu 
Fred 60 63000 dyspepsia 
Gill 60 63000 diabetes 
Hera 60 63000 gastritis 
 
Age Zipcode Disease 
[21, 32] [10k, 22k] dyspepsia 
[21, 32] [10k, 22k] gastritis 
[27, 36] [18k, 37k] flu 
[27, 36] [18k, 37k] gastritis 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] bronchitis 
[54, 60] [60k, 63k] flu 
60 63000 dyspepsia 
60 63000 diabetes 
 
